Warning! Long entry alert!

I've been thinking what to write for this for most of the week. Normally F1 tackles politics by avoiding it with a 10-foot bargepole; Bernie focuses on the almighty [insert currency here] and the FIA is apolitical by statute.

The events of the past week in the Middle East have prevented the possibility of solution through ignorance.

First of all, some background. The chain of events that led to the current FCO travel advice not to go to Bahrain unless strictly necessary started in December 2010 over in Tunisia. The recession, poor living conditions, corruption and dissatisfaction with a lack of political freedoms resulted in a population ripe for turning into a mob.

The eventual spark that ignited the fire of rebelliousness was caused by a dispute over a vegetable cart licence. Cart owner Mohamed Bouazizi, after apparently being assaulted by a police officer and unsuccessfully attempting to get the local police station to hear his complaint, set himself on fire in protest. The people, for the most part, sided with the cart owner. Initial protests concerning his treatment by the police were met with tear gas, obstructionism and a "quasi-curfew".

The people increased their demands in response, eventually demanding the removal from government of the entire ruling party (RCD) and release of political prisoners. Even a reformation of the government with a reduced number of RCD members did nothing to quell the uprising. Eventually the army sided with the protesters and mass resignations followed.

This Sidi Bouzid Revolt triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East. Most of the world is currently in recession, but many if not most countries in the Middle East are characterised with various types of authoritarian regime. While the majority have democratic layers, there have been as many ways of implementing them as there are countries.

Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with corruption and generate nations of layered societies.As Frank Herbert correctly noted, "The layered society is an invitation to violence". This is because each layer tends to envy, covet and/or despise the other layers, resulting in rampant power abuse. In turn, a desire is created to take what rightfully belongs to others, which remains undisclosed and unsatisfied due to fear of said power abuse and the lack of incentive for the powerful to enable uncontrolled social movement.

The countries of the Middle East have shared a bond with one another since Islam first united their common ideologies. They have also experienced common changes that have made them more vulnerable to a tidal change in popular thinking. The average population has slowly become younger, therefore less likely to think conservatively or in accord with the opinions of their elders. They have been typically better-educated than before; in many of the Middle Eastern countries, agriculture has become less important as more highly-skilled services such as banking and business administration have increased in importance.

Oil, which has slowed the transition from agriculture to service-based industry, is becoming less important as it is increasingly clear the resource is finite. Many of the countries which had oil have diversified successfully, but it has broadened horizons.

Most importantly, many people are engaging with the internet and social media - which are proving more difficult to censor than more traditional communication channels. Newspapers, broadcast channels and even static web sites can easily be influenced by rulers in their home nation should they be so inclined. Trying to influence thousands or even millions of individual connections and accounts across multiple networks, many of which aren't even in the Middle East, has proven vastly more complicated.

The reduced censorship has not only emboldened people but provided easier access in materials on how to voice their complaints. Non-violent manuals easily downloadable (PDF) from the internet have contributed to the ability of protest organisers to make their protests effective. People who have been involved in previous protests can share their expertise.

Furthermore, it is easier for the people to give direct accounts of what they believe to the world and for the world to answer back. Most of the traffic on social networks consists of spam, banter and matters of relatively minor importance (in approximately that order). However, it is also possible for a large number of people to give the same message to those involved in political strife. It reminds those people that the world is watching. It can help people remember that those people have standards and thus utilise peer pressure to modify behaviour. It can demonstrate the failure of censorship and the politics of fear. It can even encourage normally-apathetic people to engage with the issues of the day, thus increasing pressure on the governments not directly involved to state their stance and bring their great powers to bear.

All this provided a highly unstable backdrop; the governments of many Middle Eastern countries simply hadn't adapted to the changes enforced by the passing of time. Protest dominoes suddenly looked likely, just as Gdańsk had become the trigger for the downfall of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and pan-European revolts in the 1840s started with the Chartists in Britain.

Egypt was the next to feel the wrath of a dissatisfied people. Change happened over a period of weeks, as various measures were tried and found wanting by a population wanting wholesale regime change rather than just dismissing the odd minister.

In fact, there had been resistance for years but it took the Tunisian experience to catalyse it into the violent clashes, mass striking and constant demonstrating that eventually ensued. By February 11, even President Mubarak had seen the writing on the wall and resigned. Since then, things appear to have stayed calm (touch wood) pending discussions on how to ensure the reduced repression and application of a stronger democratic structure demanded by the population. Events have demonstrated that the old regimes cannot be replaced like for like and that something new is needed - and not just in Egypt.

15 other countries in the Arab world have featured protests - or more than protests - since Tunisia's revolution began. These had been going on for six weeks before the F1 world noticed, for Bahrain looked to be among the most stable of the Arab nations.

Bahrain has a prosperous economy and has had democratic institutions in its constitution for a decade. The trouble was that many people, particularly among the Shia, had not had their fortunes uplifted in line with those of their nation and the institutions are easily overruled by the King and other members of the royal family. The protestors tried to keep the sectarianism out of the equation but the government still saw a sectarian threat, which increased tensions. There were also complaints about the number of political prisoners in Bahrain. The success of the Egyptian revolt in particular inspired the dissatisfied to action.

The King paid 1000 Bahraini dinars (£615.10) to every citizen in the country on February 14, the 10-year anniversary of the constitution that should have ensured the democratic institutions were powerful. It is rumoured that this was an attempt to head off the demonstrations. If so, it failed. On February 14, there was a mass occupation of the streets across Bahrain. One protester died, but it was his funeral next day that turned the situation from a purely political problem to one that involved the motorsport community.

Police fired at the funeral procession, killing one person, injuring 25 and pushing thousands into believing the powers-that-be had abandoned them. It was into the resulting bloodstained fury that the GP2 Asia circus entered the country. Will Buxton vividly described the situation in the country on the relatively quiet day before first practise was due to begin. The reports from others indicated that increasing amounts of violence were being employed by the police and army, a tactic which never helps calmness of people or encourage stability of government. The official position attempted to reassure foreigners that they were still safe in Bahrain, but increasingly people were having doubts.

Practise itself started with the ART and iSport teams playing football against each other because the medical staff due to support the race's requirements were recalled to Manama to assist the injured. The riot police had started using live bullets in addition to the tear gas and batons used previously. Clearly, it was dangerous for the GP2 Asia people to remain in Manama and there was no prospect of getting the medical staff back in time to run the race anyway. This was sufficient reason for the FIA's Bahrain branch to cancel the race, using Article 1.3 of Appendix O of the International Sporting Code:

"Recommendations regarding the number of personnel should be complied with throughout the event; if it is not possible... ...the programme of the event should be rearranged".

The press release was rather less verbose, but it posed a clear message to F1. If Bahrain could not safely host a GP2 race, what chance a F1 test two weeks later - or indeed the F1 race a week after that? Many people on the internet were arguing against going to Bahrain, and not because of the complaints of previous years concerning low overtaking opportunities and general blandness. The violence in the region is ongoing, despite the Crown Prince's pleas for calm and orders for the army to leave Manama having resulted in an entire day without bloodshed.

Insurance for many people in the F1 paddock is currently invalid with respect to travel to Bahrain, and is likely to remain so unless and until the various international travel advisers are assured the current peace is permanent. Sponsors may be reluctant to associate themselves with the country for the time being. Nick Heidfeld, one of the more thoughtful drivers on the F1 grid, has urged sensitivity - a level-headed approach, but is there time between now and the point where visa applications and freight transportation demand an answer?

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph? What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East? Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future? Oh, and is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

I hope to answer these in my next blog entry. Until then, I leave you with a link to a comment I made on F1 Fanatic that may convince you that F1 - whatever it does - cannot be truly apolitical about this.

Force India's performance in testing this week has been remarkable. It's difficult to draw any definite conclusions because there are only 4 teams using 2010 machinery at this time (the other three are McLaren, Virgin and Hispania). However, of those four one would normally expect McLaren to be the fastest, given that their team was second in the championship and the others didn't manage to be in the top 6. Also, there could be some variance concerning how much technologies such as the F-duct and adjustable front wing were being used. Such technologies are easy to switch on and off but cannot be used on 2011 cars.

Despite the above, Force India have had the fastest overall time at all three lunch-times so far. On Monday, despite stopping testing some time before the end of the day, Nico Hulkenburg and Paul di Resta finished Monday second and fourth, Paul then finished third yesterday and as I type Adrian Sutil is still first on the timesheet (Robert Kubica only went faster than him an hour-and-a-quarter before the end of the test - as I started typing the next paragraph down). There's only been one small stoppage (di Resta lost some time at the start of Tuesday) and Force India is close to having 300 laps under its belt. In short, Force India has outperformed even McLaren.

The running is primarily helping Force India understand the tyres better; the new Pirellis are understood to be very high-wearing, so managing that wear will be critical in the success of any team this year. The new VJM-04, due to be launched next week, should give a true barometer of how much slower a 2011 car should be than its 2010 equivalent.

Testing has been enjoyable so far in F1, particularly because of the innovation already on show. The prospect of a mid-grid team - Renault - having come up with a new innovation in F1 is exciting. They've got exhausts coming out of the sidepods instead of the back of the car. This should increase the amount of pressure underneath the car.

Sending exhaust fumes out using the Renault way should become increasingly useful in future seasons because the energy coming from the engine could be used to help power KERS. According to the rules, KERS has to be positioned between the cockpit and the front of the engine, so the movement of the fumes would be a viable means of kinetic energy recovery. Without the need for long-distance transmission of the energy before release, it would be possible to use a much greater proportion of the energy using this source than from the brakes. Energy harvesting would occur under acceleration (when there is generally little demand on the driver), which makes for much better handling than the brake-harvesting version (which ends up altering the behaviour of the car at the point where it is already at its least predictable).

Given that the Le Mans Series primary prototype class now allows any form of energy recovery rather than just the kinetic variety, it's conceivable that an enlightened FIA might permit heat recovery - another mechanism which would make the sidepod-exhausts more useful. Airbox kinetic/heat energy harvesting would be even more useful, but maybe that's hoping for too much innovation from a governing body which stands to gain from regulating as much as possible using as many rules as possible.

I don't agree with KERS in top-level racing, but if we must have KERS, it should be a sensible version. Hopefully, Renault's discovery will encourage the FIA to permit the best of a bad job to be made.

I really should write blog entries more often. I promised myself I'd write when Force India made its mind up who it was having, but I should have known from past experience that Vijay Mallya and his lieutenants have more patience than me!

One question I was asked in response to my previous entry on The Ecology of Wind Tunnels v Track Testing was from Robf1ction:

Could we scrap both and make the weekends 4 days long?

This struck me as an interesting thought, so I attempted to do some sums. From the previous entry, I dragged over the following:

• 8.280 kg per night to travel to a hotel
• 1.376 kg per component
• 11854.683 components used per day.

To make a four-day weekend work, it will be necessary for the teams to stay a night longer at each race. Assuming that the example used for Spanish testing is a sensible average for distance between track and hotel, we can use the same 8.280 kg figure for each race - 45 is the maximum number of people a team can have in the paddock. There are 20 races in the 2011 schedule, so:

8.280 kg x 20 = 165.6 kg

The other two figures are to provide a component cost for the extra days. Since the fourth day is designed to substitute both wind tunnel and track testing, I will assume it will be run to the same sort of schedule as a test. This is done by multiplying the carbon cost of a component with the number of components used in a day and then multiply the result by the number of races/extra days:

1.376 kg x 11854.683 = 16312.044 kg or 16.312 tonnes

16312.044 * 20 = 326240.87616 kg or 326.241 tonnes.

Now 326.214 tonnes may sound a lot. However, the question was whether it would be worth doing this instead of track and wind tunnel testing. So let's grab the relevant figures and compare:

1 year of wind tunnel testing = 182.706 tonnes

4-day "local" track test = 16.341 tonnes

4-day "long-range" track test =  69.201 tonnes

All these figures are lower than the figure for the 4-day weekend. However, seeing the amount of each that could be fitted into the carbon needed to do 4-day weekends would indicate whether this represents a better path than the one robf1ction proposed or a mere illusion:

326.214 / 182.706 = 1.785 years (representing 24/7 running of one 60% tunnel, a 2-shift pattern on another and 7 days in a 100% tunnel - more than current limits but not as much as big teams used to do a decade ago)

326.214 / 16.341 = 19.963 "local" 4-day tests (this would nearly, but not quite, be one after every race. Would suit Ferrari, but probably not Sauber due to them having no suitably "local" track)

326.214 / 69.201 = 4.714 "long-range" 4-day tests. No contest, having 4-day weekends is better in terms of car mileage efficiency than carting cars to Spain for standalone testing. Unless it's Hispania, of course (being based in Spain, a test there would be "local" for them)

From a carbon perspective, a 4-day weekend scheme is better for F1 than testing abroad. Of that there is no question. It is about equal to a 4-day "local" testing method, except that mandating "local" testing would lead to large and intractable inequalities in the field due to varying access to a "local" circuit.

It is debatable whether the wind tunnel is more efficient than a 4-day weekend; a wind tunnel with no testing at all would be less use to a team than one under the current scheme (where straight-line testing can help triangulate the data). I'd go so far as to say it would struggle to be effective. If it could be made effective, it would be more ecologically sound than the 4-day weekend, but there is a compromise that would allow the best of both.

Right now, we are awaiting four "long-range" winter tests. What if these were replaced with 4-day weekends? Place a 4-day non-championship race in the winter to a) give the teams a little testing to sort out major issues b) stop everyone from getting too bored and c) let one of the Spanish circuits be moved to prevent race event fatigue in Spain.

Back-to-back races wouldn't have 4-day weekends because the 3 days left to travel between races would be asking for cargo or people not to be in place when everything gets going again and also risks people getting over-stressed from having to spend so much time in "work" mode without a proper break. There are 4 such weekends in 2011 (meaning 8 races wouldn't have a fourth day for testing).

It would be an extra 16 race weekend days but 16 test days would be lost, so the carbon used in components would be neutralised. A small amount of extra carbon would be used for the race:

Race fuel carbon usage: (62.5* - 16.221**) / 170 = 0.2722294 tonnes or 272.229 kg

Hotel carbon usage: 8.280 kg

Total: 272.229 + 8.280 = 380.509 kg

I would compare this to the amount of carbon used in the four winter tests and the alternative paths previously explored, but given that they were all in tonnes and this one's in kilogrammes, only pedants and mathematically-minded people are likely to care. I think we can live with the extra race producing a fraction of the carbon of a local test. It would certainly be more carbon-conserving than the modes of testing currently in use.

Thank you for the great idea, robf1ction. Hopefully one day the F1 team bosses will agree to this sort of thing and thank you too :)

Warning! Long entry alert!

This blog entry was prompted by TEF20's comment in Formula 1 Blog, which in turn was about Ferrari opposing the 4-cylinder engine concept mooted by the FIA for 2013. About a third of the way through replying, I realised this "comment" was not only too long for a comment (2549 words are too many, even by my reckoning!) but only tangentially relevant to the topic. Therefore, it was moved to my blog.

TEF20 was considering in his comment how reducing the amount wind tunnels are used in F1 could allow more testing to happen, therefore making a lot of fans happier because they can see more of the cars (among several other benefits). It certainly sounded an intriguing idea, so I decided to try mathematically test it - with mixed results.

Firstly, it is true that wind tunnels consume colossal amounts of electricity (thus carbon) whenever they are used. We are not talking hairdryers pushing air through plastic sweet tubes onto miniature models here. The vast and vastly powerful variety used in F1 use enough energy that the electricity companies demand to be told before teams turn them on so that demand can be planned. The two tunnels in Brackley (for Mercedes and Force India) probably consume more electricity than everything else in the 12.848 km between Brackley and Silverstone put together (I have no data to confirm this, but if the steelworks in Sheffield, working at full blast, can consume more electricity than the rest of the city put together, then it is surely reasonable to suggest that two powerful industrial energy-guzzlers can use more electricity than the sum total of a few villages).

Secondly, none of the foregoing means that track tests are minor consumers of carbon either. It takes a lot of equipment to conduct a test.

Test teams take at least three lorries with them, alongside cars or buses capable of carrying 45 staff. The lorries would use 17.082 g/km per ton. If the team went in buses (probably the most ecologically sound way of taking that many people), each bus would use 10.249 g/km per passenger.

The Ecology of Test Travel

If we assume that the lorries are 20 tonnes each including their loads, then that gives us 683.28 g/km for the lorries and 461.205 g/km for the buses - or a total of 1144.485 g/km.

So taking Mercedes as an example, quartered the relatively short 12.848 km away from Silverstone. They would need 29.409 kg of carbon emissions to get to the test and back, assuming the test got rained/frozen off.

If a team like Mercedes wishes to avoid that fate (frozen/rained-off testing being completely useless in terms of data collection), it is likely to go to Spain. That means sending everything through the Eurotunnel, down the length of France and down part of north-east Spain to reach the nearest track (Barcelona). I will assume for the sake of ecological sensitivity that nothing is flown. And then return, of course. The distance is 1752.608 km, therefore the carbon emissions would amount to 4011.667 kg, or 4.012 tonnes. Again, before running or indeed the travelling between hotel(s) and test track/travel routes that would be required to make a road-only test work.

If we assume the team must go to a hotel if they wish to stay overnight in Spain, and that (as is common) they stay at the cheapest nearby hotel (Hotel Ciutat at the moment), they need to travel 17.952 km extra per overnight stay. If this is done in buses, that's another 8.280 kg per night. They also need to stay there before and after each test so that they don't waste the first few hours of testing and/or risk total collapse trying to return to the UK. This makes a typical four-day Spanish test (as generally practised in F1 these days) 4.053 tonnes per team.

This mounts up. Each F1 team used 62.5 tonnes on average for fuel in races and tests in 2009. but most of them went to Spain for 4 tests prior to the season beginning and then did 8 local tests in-season. That would be 16.221 tonnes just for the current testing regime (races are more efficient because one Bernie Air plane can take multiple teams' stuff - even though the method of transport is more wasteful per item, less fuel is needed overall due to the airborne equivalent of carpooling).

The Ecology of Wind Tunnel Testing

The entire electricity consumption of the average team for 2009 was 365.412 tonnes. This includes the vast amounts necessary to power the CFD systems currently in place and all the manufacturing equipment as well as the windtunnel situation (teams are only allowed to use one less-than-60%-scale tunnel at a time apart from 16 hours of full-scale tunnel time per year, but there's no rule saying a team can't use one of its tunnels while the other one's going through a maintenance/calibration procedure, for example). If CFD, manufacturing and other non-wind tunnel uses for electricity are assumed to take up 50% of the electricity teams use, that puts wind tunnels on 182.706 tonnes/year. Unfortunately, the data does not exist to tease out how much wind tunnels specifically use.

Provisional Comparison Between Wind Tunnels and Track Tests

Local tests are pretty efficient uses of carbon dioxide. A team could test in its backyard every day for an entire year and not use up half as much carbon dioxide as it would doing one test in Spain. Unfortunately most teams are British and the neighbours would complain.

Testing on the continent when a team is based in England is much more of a problem. Large teams used to do three-day tests every fortnight in-season with a test team that was almost completely separate from the team that went to races, which would clearly be far more expensive than the amount used in factory testing procedures. Even if it were more ecologically efficient, it would not be possible to transfer to such an arrangement in the current climate.

How many four-day long-range tests could a team do with the carbon it would save from relinquishing the right to use a wind tunnel for six months of the year (this would allow the team to still use the tunnel to create its cars, but not to develop them)?

Six months of windtunnel on my back-of-blog calculations would be 91.353 tonnes. Divide that by the 4.053 tonnes each long-range test takes and you get 22.53. Which means that you could do just over twenty-two-and-a-half four-day Spanish tests for the price of having the wind tunnel on for 6 months.

How convenient. That's one for every race of the season with a little bit left over.

Or it would be had FOTA not set themselves a 15% carbon reduction plan to be reached by the end of 2012. So let's take 15% off that and see what we have.

19.15.

Still almost enough for one four-day test after each race of the season. Which would be an interesting idea for enhancing development while massively cutting carbon emissions. CFD-only development would be more efficient than CFD + wind tunnel development in terms of carbon and could be a step towards removing wind tunnels from the equation entirely. Fans would love to see their heroes honing their cars carefully for a relatively low fee, teams and circuit are already set up to accommodate them and it also cuts a lot of the expense connected with travelling because they're already there.

The Villain of the Piece

There is one carbon-related problem though. To test, one must have extra pieces to test. They have to be manufacturered and transported.

There are two forms of carbon source to be considered. In-house consumption of electricity for manufacturing comes from the same 365.412 tonnes of CO2 as the wind tunnel. We've already removed the wind tunnel through a back-of-blog guesstimate of 182.706 tonnes. There are three things using up the rest of that carbon dioxide - CFD, manufacturing and sundry expenses such as lighting and heating. If we say that CFD is 60% (there are some powerful computers used in design work) and the sundry is 10%, that leaves 30% of the non-wind tunnel expenditure - or 15% of the whole - as manufacturing expenditure, making it 54.812 tonnes per team. Materials manfacturing is 613.892 tonnes per year for the average team - just over 50% of the total carbon consumption. So the total carbon used for components per team, on average, is 668.704 tonnes. These do all the races as well as testing and also counts manufacturing errors that never make it to the car in any capacity whatsoever.

That Which Is Obsolete and Useless

Every non-homologated item on the car can be expected to change at least once in a year for those teams that can afford to do so and see some point in the attempt. Some teams' wings changed 10 times in 2010, but that's an extreme. Probably more accurate is to assume for the sake of calculation that everything changes an average of twice a season. When testing enables it, all of these changes will be tested.

Not everything that gets tested makes it onto the car. At the moment, it seems to be accepted that most teams bring along 4-5 major upgrade packages per season to have one of those fail, giving a minimum of 20% failure rate. Extra testing would enable teams to tease out which bit of the package is failing easier, perhaps dropping the failure rate to 10%. The problem comes when one considers the amount that can be tested in a particular test - and therefore rejected.

The amount varies massively from test to test because the agenda could be anything from back-to-back testing of a complete new package against the current one - a process that generally results in one package or the other being fully rejected - to incremental honing and systems checks, both of which involve negligible part rejection. In the most through version of the procedures, it takes three back-to-back runs - 9 laps or about 15 minutes excluding analysis and preparation time - to ascertain whether a component worked. Of course the teams do quite a bit of analysis before accepting or rejecting components, but usually other things would be tested during at least part of that analysis. However, there's simply no way round the fact that parts take time to fit and remove, or that the car will need a wipe-down at the very least after each run to maximise data parity. The preparation figure ranges from about 5 minutes if it's simply a wipe-down plus fitting a new front wing to the best part of half a day for certain combinations of internal component (especially if removal requires the fuel tank to be adjusted in any way). Half an hour average preparation is probably a reasonable ballpark figure, with the caveat that it varies massively according to the components involved.

There are about 80,000 components in a F1 car, but that's not the best figure to use for this set of calculations. Some things (like the engine, which accounts for many of the components) are homologated and therefore can't be modified by the teams. Also, some components (such as fuel tanks) couldn't meaningfully be tested by the teams in this way - they'd be tested using other methods, most often by the third-party suppliers who produce such specialised kit. Finally, some components are typically tested in clusters (come on, have you ever heard of a team taking a gearbox, putting in a different 4th-gear dog ring and then running the car again just to see if the new dog ring is an improvement on the last one?)

Time Is Carbon

Taking another angle, if it takes about 45 minutes to do the running and preparing to test a typical component/cluster and a test typically runs for 7 hours (9-5 am excluding an hour of lunch), then it would be possible to test 9 components/clusters in a day, or 36 per 4-day test. 3.6 of these will prove failures (in that they won't be better than the previous versions).

It's not so simple to derive the average carbon cost of a component because it's not clear what proportion of manufactured components don't make it onto a car. However, if a 1% failure rate is assumed for manufacture (probably an underestimate) and it is considered that teams typically use six chassis in a season, replacing an additional component every 20 minutes a car runs, then a rough estimate can be derived.

The six chassis would be 480,000 components. There were 17 races in 2009, 4 four-day "long-range" Spanish tests and 8 one-day local tests. A race consists of 4 hours of practise, 1 of qualifying and up to 2 hours of racing, so it would be fair to say it has the same mileage as a one-day test, just spread over a longer period of time. So that would be 41 days equivalent of running, with 369 components/clusters tested (and therefore 36.9 proving "failures") and 861 components needing replacement - on top of the components already on the cars. That's a minimum of 481,230 components produced per season excluding failures, meaning at least 4812 components which failed at manufacturing. So the total amount of carbon used in manufacturing must take 486,042 components into account.

From this, the average carbon estimate per component is 668.704 / 486,042 = 0.001375815 tonnes/component or 1.376 kg/component. To put this into perspective, each extra component needed for a F1 team is just under a third of the carbon consumed for travelling to a local test.

This is significant.

The Components of (Climate) Change

If you assume that the six chassis and associated extra components were meant to do exactly the 2009 season and no more, then an adjustment to the carbon figure of extra testing becomes possible.

486,042 / 41 = 11854.683 components used per day.

11854.683 * 1.376 kg/component = 16312.044 kg/day = 16.312 tonnes/day.

16.312 + 0.029 = 16.341 tonnes/test (for a local test)

16.312 * 4 (for a 4-day "long-range" test) = 65.248 tonnes/4-day test.

65.248 + 4.053 = 69.201 tonnes/test (for a long-range test)

So how much testing can now be fitted into that six months of wind tunnel time (in terms of carbon emissions)?

91.353 / 69.201 = 1.320 four-day "long-range" tests. Let's call it 1 and a remainder to see if we can get any local tests out of the remainder:

22.152 / 16.341 = 1.355 local tests. That would be another 1.

At this point, converting windtunnel usage into extra testing time ceases to make much ecological sense.

Conclusions

We've established (albeit with rather more back-of-blog calculation than I'm entirely comfortable with doing) that wind tunnel testing is more efficient carbon-wise than track testing and that the reason is not, as one might suppose, travel, but the manufacture of components to enable that testing to occur. The average team, under normal circumstances, surely gets more out of six months of wind tunnel testing than five days of track testing. The question is: do we, the fans, get as much out of those five testing days as out of the six months of wind tunnel work?