This entry has taken me some time to figure out how to write. Something's been bugging me about recent F1, primarily since the Turkish Grand Prix. However, it was only when Duncan Stephen wrote his item on why he was finding 2011-spec F1 not to his taste that I figured out how to write my own objections to what's been going on. My first reaction to the piece was:

Hurrah! Somebody doesn't think that the current F1 is a) the bee's knees or b) only ruined by excess overtaking.

For me the proximate problem (i.e. the one that's directly causing me dissatisfaction with F1) is meaningless overtaking. In Turkey in particular, the method of generation of overtaking caused lots of zero-sum exchanges - lots of passes but most of them were never going to affect anything in a month of Sundays. They were just going to get re-passed later in the corner sequence or else in the DRS zone the following lap.

DRS foreshortens the process of passing even when it's producing a reasonable net increase of overtaking. This makes it less skilful and also less significant in the context of a race. Those comparing Turkey 2011 to Japan 2005 have forgotten, among other things, that many of the overtaking moves in the latter took laps to set up. Yes, it was normal for cars to be innately 1-2 seconds faster or slower than each other that year, making things difficult enough for complaints, but that still shows planning and skill were important.

If pressing buttons is the new hot skill for F1, why aren't all the F1 drivers being sent on evening typing courses? Why aren't fit typists with clean driving licences being considered for F1 testing roles over the heads of those who have toiled in F3 and GP2?

Besides all that, DRS should never have been experimented with in a race weekend. It should have been tested properly prior to use, and then implemented equally and effectively in all races.

Despite the emphasis on changes to the racing, qualifying has now become the be- and end-all of F1. The only reason it's not become the only non-accidental deciding factor is because many teams haven't worked out it's merely a question of getting your single lap per session faster than those around you. It's no longer possible to waste tyres doing two runs. If you're first into the first corner, DRS means you'll be able to pull out a big lead and protect your tyres as you will while everyone battles behind you. I felt like kicking Lewis Hamilton and Jenson Button when they did their little duel at the start; by focusing on each other they lost time to Sebastian Vettel and wore out their tyres, which made it impossible for either to do anything about the race leader.

That's right, to get exciting racing for the lead in this system you need a team to qualify both its drivers right behind the lead one (without the pole-sitter's team-mate or any other team being in between) and then execute firm team orders on lap 1 to stop them from attempting to race each other. The "no. 2" would be tasked with staying 1.1 seconds ahead of 4th place and then keeping a consistent pace to remain 1.1 seconds ahead of 4th place, preserving the invisible barrier. "Good" thing systematic team orders are permitted this year, else every race win would be unsalvageable.

If you're not a potential race winner, qualifying is still vital and still has to be done as a single-lap run for each of the three sessions. This would be one set of tyres for Q1 and Q2 and then a second set for whichever session is believed to be the final one. If you get through to Q3 when it wasn't expected, simply sit out the session to preserve your strategy. This is because if you can't look after your tyres, the best strategy is to have as many new ones as possible. If you can do that, it's irrelevant whether you can pass the people around you (with gimmicks or not) because you'll probably gain a pit stop on them - especially if your car is relatively kind to tyres like the Sauber is). Even if you don't, you'll gain considerable amounts of time and flexibility.

It's bizarre that the strategies dictated by fragile tyres and ease of DRS-based tactics mean that the act of passing - DRS-based or otherwise - is almost irrelevant to the results.

The trick is to evenly space out all tyre changes according to when your car will need them, which should be quite straightforward to determine based upon performance in the first stint. It doesn't even need anyone to bother doing a pre-race equation - it's simply a question of chucking tyres at a car when it needs them. Pit strategy outside the options a car may deny has now got so little relevance that the discretionary laps can be deployed whenever the team wishes. All the strategy divergence is down to two factors: a) due to the tyre philosophy being new, different cars treat them very differently and b) many teams do not appear to have figured out what's going on yet, so haven't even taken the obvious step of going single-lap each session up to this point.

So we now have the single-lap qualifying some people have called for. It's not improving the racing - it's taken it away. Duncan Stephen has called it "one step away from fixing the result". I wish I could be so reserved on the matter. As far as I can see, it is fixing the result to whoever happens to be the fastest one-run driver/car combination in qualifying, and for most of the top 10, stupidity and extreme tyre wear permitting, they are fixed in the positions in which they qualified.

KERS doesn't seem to do anything to help the sport - it just seems to be something tagged on to keep the stupider elements of the environmental movement a little more content. It's in F1 in a form that will never be utilised on the road (road KERS will be a very gentle addition for all accelerations, not a big boost done occasionally), delivering power in a way that makes overtaking more difficult (which may be protecting us from even worse problems with DRS) and with a lack of freedom which places it firmly in "gimmick" rather than the "feature" it is about to become in sportscar racing. That it's not facing a campaign for removal at this time shows just how much of a problem DRS presents.

One of the things which worries me - and I think it's one of the things that's made it difficult for me to blog - is that so many people don't seem to see the medium-sized picture let alone the big one. They see lots of passing, lots of energy, lots of confusion - and start cheering. They do not see that it's causing very predictable strategies, very predictable results and a very samey feel to races. Energy and confusion might have got many into the sport but if it had kept being those things at the expense of everything else - especially the surprise element - they'd have stopped watching within a season because there'd be nothing to grip them with. If I wanted to know the winner 24 hours before the race and the result of a race for most of the field on lap 15, I'd put on a season review DVD. At least then there'd be decent camera direction...

Sport is a form of entertainment. If done properly, it will be entertaining whether or not the "show" is considered (the "show" only affects how many people get entertained and the length of the entertaining). The decade-long trend towards considering "show" over "sport" is nearly complete. But F1 is not reality TV. Reality TV tropes do not necessarily work for sports such as F1, even with extreme tweaking. The cost is that F1 will soon be unable to be called the pinnacle of motor sport, on the grounds that it will not be a sport at all. The sport needs urgent attention in order to save it, to take away the worst of the gimmicks. That way it might be possible to see how to get the enjoyment of racing to run clear again.

Though I'll let the powers-that-be tweak the "show" enough to get a competent TV direction system and crew. The current one hasn't worked since FOM took over the job and 2011 is exposing their weaknesses so much. It's even more frustrating to be watching a predictable race when perfectly competent commentators, used to having at least vaguely usable images to commentate from, find themselves clueless to things you figured out 30 laps before because you, unlike them, could see the little ticker-tape running across the bottom of the screen...

I've had a fortnight of not really wanting to blog for some reason. I promised mageshmagi this blog entry on Mercedes and Schumacher's underperformances before I went on unintended hiatus.

First of all, it was always going to be difficult for Mercedes to match its precedescor's antics. Brawn managed to win the one driver's and constructor's title it entered with considerable aplomb. Nonetheless, it had to do so with an unusual resource distribution. When the car was designed in mid-2008, money was practically falling from the sky, but by the time it hit the track the primary funding source (Honda) had reduced dramatically. It funded the season's running costs (albeit only for a much smaller operation than the one it had been when the team was called Honda), but did not fund  the creation of the 2010 challenger. Therefore the 2010 car was hamstrung by a serious lack of funds.

Then Ross Brawn made an intelligent move. By hiring Nico Rosberg, he gained a driver who is intelligent and ready to take a step up from his previous team - the plucky but gracefully-declining Williams. He'd been team leader there for two seasons and proved to be a good team leader for Mercedes.

That wasn't the plan. The plan had been for Rosberg to ably back up a seven-time world champion who would break all records and be a legendary touchstone for all at Mercedes - Michael Schumacher. He was duly hired, to the astonishment of most of the F1 community. He said the right things (though I was somewhat worried that how he said them didn't match how he'd said them before) and testing wasn't terrible for him.

Just as well it wasn't terrible for him because it was quite clear that the Mercedes W01 had suffered for its lack of development funding.  It wasn't a dominating influence or even on the pace of the likes of Red Bull. This was going to be a tough season. The engine was beautifully fast but the chassis didn't respond well to its tyres. Michael and Nico (along with Felipe Massa at Ferrari) frequently noted that the front tyres did not support their driving styles, which tend to involve quite hard braking.

Jenson Button and Rubens Barrichello, who'd been at Brawn in 2009, both have much gentler braking styles and would have suited the Mercedes W01 better. However, neither of them were options for Mercedes. Jenson wanted a fresh challenge and Rubens had been harbouring a desire to race for Williams for quite a while. Still, without a hard-braking driver to ask for tips during development, it is easy to see why this significant flaw appeared in Mercedes' first car.

What is more difficult to understand is why the 2011 car met a similar fate. After all, Felipe's 2011 Ferrari is much more to his liking. There was a major reshuffle in the factory staff towards the end of 2010, which delayed completion of the W02. There was also a decision made to start with a basic car and upgrade it a lot as soon as possible, even though that didn't really work for them in 2010 either. An upgrade can fix many things but not a fundamental weakness in the car.

Due to that philosophy, we may see considerable improvement across the season. Upgrades can fix minor problems. Even though the problems with the Mercedes' tendency to consume tyres rapidly do not constitute "minor", things can be done to reduce that flaw and fix less noticeable difficulties such as a lack of downforce compared to Ferrari and Red Bull. The engine's still strong (unsurprising due to engine sorbet regulations) but it's not enough.

Michael Schumacher does not seem to have adapted to being in an imperfect car very well. He tends to make more mistakes in that situation than we were accustomed to seeing in his previous time in F1. Hence he tends to hit cars instead of passing them, impairing his performances in an already non-optimised car. He's also started to show tendencies towards crumbling in whichever qualifying session is his last one in a given day. This is the very effect he used to trigger in other people back in 2006. It's the sign of a driver that, for all his determination, diligence and innate skill, has gone from the hunted to the hunter - and vastly preferred being the hunted.

If Michael ever wants to see a podium again, let alone a win, he needs to re-assume the mentality of the hunted - the one who leads and is forever trying to escape, willing to experiment to improve but ever holding their nerve while doing so. Perhaps Mercedes may benefit from a little of that too, but mostly it just needs to put more emphasis on getting the car right the first time.