The F1 circus going to Bahrain on the FIA's orders despite this contravening the FIA's own Statutes (more detail in the "UniFacepalm" entry) for those who are interested) and then being further in breach due to one of Force India's hire cars being attacked despite safety reassurances from the FIA. This means the event technically doesn't meet Article 17 of the International Sporting Code any more. This in turn means that F1 cars can no longer partake of the race, if Article 5.2 of the Sporting Regulations is anything to go by. As such, there are two very good regulatory reasons why F1 cannot race in Bahrain.

In light of the above, the F1 race, by the FIA's own regulations, should not be happening at all. Therefore I intend to ignore all sporting aspects of the Bahrain weekend. There will be no live-commenting on Twitter or the Fisichella Forum (as I normally provide), nor will I comment on any aspect of any driver's on-track performance.

Discussions of non-sporting aspects of F1, and of non-F1 events, will continue as normal and appropriate.

I hope this is OK with everyone and apologise to anyone who is inconvenienced by this service interruption/boycott. Non-F1 items are unaffected by this boycott, and I intend to resume live-commenting F1 events in Spain and (possibly) the Mugello test beforehand, subject to the FIA not breaking any regulations in the course of going there.

Attempting to discuss things about Monaco has proved a frustrating experience. I am accustomed to being in discussions and even arguments about contentious bits of the race. I am not accustomed to major events happening in a race with seemingly only me noticing. 

Firstly, the crash that caused the red flag. It has been established that it was a complicated mess, but what sparked it? I've seen blame put on several people, primarily Adrian Sutil. What none of those blaming Adrian seem to have noticed was that he took damage in a collision three laps earlier with Kamui Kobayashi. This is clearly demonstrated in Adrian suddenly falling into the clutches of the midfield pack that was in process of being lapped.

He was one second than usual on lap 65 (the lap of the pass - note that all lap numbers on the graph are transposed by one lap), became 3 seconds slower than usual on lap 66 (the lap after Kamui passed him) and 4 seconds slower than usual on laps 67 and 68. On laps 69 and 70, Adrian is 20 seconds a lap slower than usual - but both include pit stop time for replacing tyres. This indicates progressive damage. Given that Kobayashi hit the right rear tyre and it was this tyre that ended up in need of a replacement, it is perfectly reasonable to consider that a weakness in the tyre (underinflation from a slow puncture would be most likely) contributed to Adrian's crash.

I cannot begrudge Kamui his 5th because he was overdue one, but I do not feel that this exempts him from having his race properly analysed.

Secondly, the whole raft of complaints about being able to change tyres/wings/springs on the grid and Pastor Maldonado's removal from the results by Lewis Hamilton. While I see a point to the complaints about the Lewis/Pastor crash in particular, all three debates have missed the most important point - that Article 18 of the General Prescriptions prevented the restart from happening in the first place.

Article 18 of the General Prescriptions (link in PDF) has three cases concerning red flags. Initially I'd thought this was in the International Sporting Code, but it appears this particular rulebook also applies to every international racing series (Article 1). Article 18 describes mid-race stoppages using Cases A, Case B and Case C. These will be familiar to those who recall the contents of 2003-era F1 Sporting Regulations documents. For the people who haven't done so, the cases refer to when the red flag is flown and determine what happens thereafter.

Case A is for when the red flag flies within the first 2 laps. Basically, the race is treated as if it never began.

Case B is for when the red flag flies between 2 laps and 75%. The race is restarted on a 10-minute procedure when possible and the running resumes from the lap where it ended.

Case C is for when the red flag flies between 75% and the end of the race. The race result is called then and there. No restart is attempted even if it would be easy to do so. The race is deemed to have finished when the red flag flies, though there is a countback rule.

72 laps out of 78 is 92.307% of the race, which is considerably more than 75%. Clearly this is a Case C situation.

The inclusion of the General Prescriptions in the list of regulations applicable to F1 on the FIA's website means that the document must be taken seriously. Nonetheless, the General Prescriptions is overruled by the F1 Sporting Regulatoins and the International Sporting Code if there are contradictory clauses.

However, no such clauses exist in either document on the question of Case C restarts. There is nothing in either the International Sporting Code or the F1 Sporting Regulations that allows for a red flag beyond the 75% mark to be interpreted as anything other than the end of the race.

Even Article 41 of the F1 Sporting Regulations (the regulation most often cited as justifying the restart) doesn't do that because Article 18 of the General Prescriptions says the race ends when the red flag is flown in Case C situations. Article 41 doesn't mention anything about the definition of a red flag or end-of-race signal changing. Therefore a Case C situation falls under Article 43 (the regulations for finishing). The lack of mention of Cases A, B and C in the F1 Sporting Regulations (they was removed in 2005) does not suffice to negate the power of General Prescriptions Article 18. Article 1 of the General Prescriptions specifically says that precedence only applies in the case of contradictory regulations.

So a lot of the arguments of yesterday should have been null and void. There should have been no argument over tyre or wing changes because there shouldn't have been any laps in which to use them. Pastor and Lewis shouldn't have crashed because there shouldn't have been any time for them to crash in.

Pity the powers-that-be didn't care about their own regulations - again. Double pity that even people like Ted Kravitz (in BBC TV's coverage of the race (iPlayer link; expires 5 June 2011)) and Joe Saward presented Article 41 as if it was the only relevant item, even though it proved not to be especially relevant. When none of the people at the circuit appear to care, how can anyone else be expected to do so (other than stubborn people like me)?

Contents

In Article 28, "Homologated parts" has been dropped from the title after being added in 2010. Seems quite odd, since I had expected there to be some homologated parts.

Article 16

The stewards have been granted wider-ranging powers under Article 16.2. Stewards may now issue post-race time penalties of any length for an incident under Article 16.2 c). Reprimands, exclusion from results and one-race suspension have also been included, though all three of these powers were already granted to the stewards under the International Sporting Code. The reprimands in particular were already commonly used. However, the one-race suspension has to be for the next event, which was not previously the case (before the suspension could be applied at any time, which was useful because it allowed time for teams to appeal against unfair uses of the power).

The only completely new power is the ability to issue post-race time penalties of any length. However, the new specifics of the suspension power worry me.

Article 20

A dramatic number of additions have been made to Article 20. In 2010, there was only one sentence: "The driver must drive the car alone and unaided". Now there are four paragraphs. Therefore the following actions have been formally banned:

- Actions that could hinder other drivers
- More than one blocking move per straight
- Leaving the circuit boundaries (defined as four wheels beyond the track edges, kerbs being outside the edges)
- Rejoining the track in a dangerous manner
- Rejoining the track having gained an advantage from leaving it
- Ignoring blue flags

Those of you who have been following F1 for a while will notice that all of those things were already prohibited. This is because they are in the International Sporting Code, with the exception of defining kerbs as not being part of the circuit (it's left to the interpretation of individual series). The additions strike me as pointless repetition.

Article 22

It has been decided that "chequered flag procedures must be respected" in testing. Technically speaking, testing isn't subject to the International Sporting Code, but red flag procedures already had to be respected. It's a sensible addition, but not one that's likely to change anything.

Article 23

There have been several changes of wording in Article 23.1 a) - "shall" has been changed to "will", the first "is" becomes the grammatically-improved "will be" and the second "is" also becomes "will be", which not only corrects the tense but also the number. Pedants everywhere will rejoice.

More importantly, Article 23.1 a) now says the "fast lane" in the pits cannot be more than 3.5 metres. In wider pit lanes, this will give the mechanics considerably more room in which to work.

Article 23.1 d) has a paragraph for the order in which cars should queue up out of the pits. They must queue up in the "fast lane" only, in the order they got there, and leave in the same order unless a car is delayed. It does not clearly answer the question of what happens if someone chooses to do a practise start.

The reference for the circumstances in which equipment can be left in the pit lane has been corrected in Article 23.1 h). It's permitted only if a car has to go to the pits between the pit lane closing and the start of the race.

An important change has been made to Article 23.1 j). Teams must provide a way of knowing when a car was released from a pit stop. This must be visible from the front of the car (implying that both the driver and the on-board camera must be able to spot this indicator). As a result, expect many fewer near-collisions in the pits and less work for the stewards to do when it comes to deciding who was wrong in the remaining cases.

Article 23.2 allows the pit lane to be closed for safety reasons. An example of when this might be done is if a car has broken down in such a way as to block the entire pit entry. Cars can still enter the pits, but only for essential and obvious repair work - perhaps to replace a puncture or a broken front wing. How that would work with the above example is unclear, but the power may still prove useful.

Article 25

Article 25.1 has been updated to indicate that the current tyre manufacturer (Pirelli) will be the sole supplier until the end of 2013.

Tyres will be considered used once they've left the pit lane according to article 25.4. Since that was already being applied in F1 on an informal basis, nothing will change, but codifying informal rules into demonstrable regulations is generally a good idea.

Articles 25.4 a) and b) have been reworded to give the FIA technical director responsibility for allocating tyres to drivers in practise sessions.

A paragraph has been inserted to deal with those situations whereby a race ends prematurely but some drivers haven't used both compounds of dry-weather tyre (assuming that driver also hasn't used a wet-weather tyre). Any driver in that situation will receive a 30-second time penalty, which is the equivalent of a stop/go penalty. Completing a normal-length race while only using one dry-weather compound (and no wet-weather ones) still means exclusion.

Article 26

Cars in Q3 will no longer be weighed during the session due to a modification to Article 26.1 a) 2). It's not clear any cars were ever weighed in the 10-minute version of Q3, but it's a good safeguard.

The reason cars in Q3 definitely won't be weighed is because Article 26.1 a) 5) makes it compulsory for all cars in Q3 to be weighed at the end of the session, either with the driver on board (as per Q1 and Q2 weighings) or separately (as per post-race weighing).

Article 28

Gearboxes must last five races instead of four due to a slight change in the wording of Article 28.6 a).

If a driver cannot start a race, does not have a substitute starting the race for them and the reason is not a penalty from the stewards, that driver is allowed to have a new gearbox next race, just the same as they would have done if they had started but failed to finish. Several parts of Article 28.6 have been modified to account for this, but it is Article 28.6 a) which rules the change in.

Dog rings on gearboxes may be changed if a gearbox changed is required during the first day of practise. This will give a little bit more flexibility to teams in the latter part of the season because they can use different gearboxes for the first day's running that are not part of the main sequence.

Article 28.6 f) will allow one additional change of gearbox outside the permissions granted without penalty. This is similar to the exemption granted for the first engine change in 2007 and could signal a transition to the "X gearboxes a season" system currently in use for engines.

Importantly, Article 28.7 has gone. Teams are now allowed to change their survival cell, wheels and crash structures whenever they like after the first race of the season, subject to normal crash testing if it's a survival cell or crash structure. Hopefully, this will prevent a repeat of the F-duct situation, where the inability to modify the monocoque meant teams were using any old hole anywhere in the cockpit for the devices, to the detriment of usability and potentially safety. Also, large differences in the handling of the wheel specifications should be easy to resolve - Ferrari got an advantage on other teams from having a particularly unusual wheel psuedo-fairing that could not inspire any improved efforts from elsewhere all season.

Article 29

Article 29.3 has had the indent removed for consistency reasons. No difference to anything on track, but much more pleasing to the eye.

Article 30

A new Article 30.3 has been inserted. Unnecessarily slow, erratic and dangerous driving is banned at all times. The International Sporting Code already bans all of the above, but this echoes and emphasises the wording used for the Article 40.5 regulation covering proper driving conduct behind the Safety Car.

More importantly, all driving between the pit exit and pit entry (defined by their respective Safety Car lines) must now be done in 145% of the fastest whole-lap time set in the first day of practise. In practise this will typically mean that nobody can do a lap in more than 150% of the time the fastest driver lapped. This appears to be designed to prevent people from trying to get severely damaged cars to the pits, doing particularly thoughtless mass blocking or doing really slow in- or out-laps (or really slow formation laps, for that matter). Laps in wet-weather running are also affected but the margin is so big that an honest lap that was too slow would indicate the session should be stopped for wet weather reasons. Note that if a slow lap is due to a problem on the main straight or in the pits (such as stalling), that delay wouldn't influence anything because of the pit straight being ignored.

Between 10 and 4 hours before the start of first and third practises, nobody from any of the teams may be at the circuit. Each team is allowed four individual exemptions per year (that is to say, four people can work overnight for one race each, or at one race a four-person squad could be present at night). It is difficult to work on a car with only four people, so all but the most urgent and straightforward all-night shifts for mechanics have now been banned. Finally people associated with teams can (usually) be assured of a half-decent night's sleep!

Article 34

Under Article 34.1, wheel fasteners may be attached and removed in parc fermé. Pitot tubes may be covered and uncovered in parc ferme but only if a change in the weather has been declared.

Article 35

The compulsory autograph signing session is now at a time and place determined by each individual promoter and does not have to happen on the first day of practise. Procedures will also be determined locally. It will be interesting to see what is done with the new freedoms.

Article 36

The 107% rule in qualifying can be found in Article 36.3. Drivers whose fastest qualifying lap is more than 107% off the fastest time set in Q1 will only be allowed to start at the discretion of the stewards and no appeals (either way) will be permitted. The stewards are at liberty to decide the order if multiple people miss the 107% benchmark and get re-admitted in the same race.

Article 38

Drivers on their formation lap will have to keep to the pit lane speed limit until they pass the pole position slot, according to Article 38.6. It's not entirely clear to me why - wasn't "greatly-reduced speed" precise enough?

An entire paragraph has been removed from Article 38.8. Cars delayed on leaving the grid may now overtake at any time prior to the pit entry in order to resume their original starting position.

Article 40

Article 40.5, which used to ban slow, erratic and dangerous driving behind the Safety Car, has been re-worded... ...but is still redundant in the face of the new Article 30.3 (and, technically speaking, the International Sporting Code that preceded both). The only difference is that behaviour that "could be deemed" dangerous is banned behind the Safety Car, while at other times only driving that is dangerous is banned.

Article 40.7 has had a couple of clauses reworded with no apparent change to their effects on the racing.

The phrase in Article 40.9 requiring the Safety Car formation to be kept as tight as possible after the Safety Car has left the scene has been deleted. This may be due to the massive pile-up in China.

Article 40.11 continues to have the clause whereby last-lap Safety Cars are not followed by green flags for the last few metres of the race.

The last two paragraphs of Article 40.14 have been modified to account for drivers being allowed to resume their previous positions on formation laps (and condensed into one paragraph in the process).

Article 42

The second paragraph of Article 42.6 has been modified to take into account the new permission to resume previous position on formation laps.

Conclusions

Most of the changes made this year are minor and repeating what already exists in the International Sporting Code. However, some important changes are hidden among them. Wider pit lanes will be nice but the mechanics will be happier with the fact that most of them won't have a single "all-nighter" all year.

Methods of identifying when a release was done should increase pit lane safety. Minimum lap speeds on track through all sessions could get interesting. However, the change I like the most this year is that the horrible homologated survival cell regulation has been thrown away.

Hopefully future years will feature less cosmetic alteration and more of the type of red-tape paring seen with the removal of certain homologated components.

Warning! Long entry alert!

I've been thinking what to write for this for most of the week. Normally F1 tackles politics by avoiding it with a 10-foot bargepole; Bernie focuses on the almighty [insert currency here] and the FIA is apolitical by statute.

The events of the past week in the Middle East have prevented the possibility of solution through ignorance.

First of all, some background. The chain of events that led to the current FCO travel advice not to go to Bahrain unless strictly necessary started in December 2010 over in Tunisia. The recession, poor living conditions, corruption and dissatisfaction with a lack of political freedoms resulted in a population ripe for turning into a mob.

The eventual spark that ignited the fire of rebelliousness was caused by a dispute over a vegetable cart licence. Cart owner Mohamed Bouazizi, after apparently being assaulted by a police officer and unsuccessfully attempting to get the local police station to hear his complaint, set himself on fire in protest. The people, for the most part, sided with the cart owner. Initial protests concerning his treatment by the police were met with tear gas, obstructionism and a "quasi-curfew".

The people increased their demands in response, eventually demanding the removal from government of the entire ruling party (RCD) and release of political prisoners. Even a reformation of the government with a reduced number of RCD members did nothing to quell the uprising. Eventually the army sided with the protesters and mass resignations followed.

This Sidi Bouzid Revolt triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East. Most of the world is currently in recession, but many if not most countries in the Middle East are characterised with various types of authoritarian regime. While the majority have democratic layers, there have been as many ways of implementing them as there are countries.

Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with corruption and generate nations of layered societies.As Frank Herbert correctly noted, "The layered society is an invitation to violence". This is because each layer tends to envy, covet and/or despise the other layers, resulting in rampant power abuse. In turn, a desire is created to take what rightfully belongs to others, which remains undisclosed and unsatisfied due to fear of said power abuse and the lack of incentive for the powerful to enable uncontrolled social movement.

The countries of the Middle East have shared a bond with one another since Islam first united their common ideologies. They have also experienced common changes that have made them more vulnerable to a tidal change in popular thinking. The average population has slowly become younger, therefore less likely to think conservatively or in accord with the opinions of their elders. They have been typically better-educated than before; in many of the Middle Eastern countries, agriculture has become less important as more highly-skilled services such as banking and business administration have increased in importance.

Oil, which has slowed the transition from agriculture to service-based industry, is becoming less important as it is increasingly clear the resource is finite. Many of the countries which had oil have diversified successfully, but it has broadened horizons.

Most importantly, many people are engaging with the internet and social media - which are proving more difficult to censor than more traditional communication channels. Newspapers, broadcast channels and even static web sites can easily be influenced by rulers in their home nation should they be so inclined. Trying to influence thousands or even millions of individual connections and accounts across multiple networks, many of which aren't even in the Middle East, has proven vastly more complicated.

The reduced censorship has not only emboldened people but provided easier access in materials on how to voice their complaints. Non-violent manuals easily downloadable (PDF) from the internet have contributed to the ability of protest organisers to make their protests effective. People who have been involved in previous protests can share their expertise.

Furthermore, it is easier for the people to give direct accounts of what they believe to the world and for the world to answer back. Most of the traffic on social networks consists of spam, banter and matters of relatively minor importance (in approximately that order). However, it is also possible for a large number of people to give the same message to those involved in political strife. It reminds those people that the world is watching. It can help people remember that those people have standards and thus utilise peer pressure to modify behaviour. It can demonstrate the failure of censorship and the politics of fear. It can even encourage normally-apathetic people to engage with the issues of the day, thus increasing pressure on the governments not directly involved to state their stance and bring their great powers to bear.

All this provided a highly unstable backdrop; the governments of many Middle Eastern countries simply hadn't adapted to the changes enforced by the passing of time. Protest dominoes suddenly looked likely, just as Gdańsk had become the trigger for the downfall of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and pan-European revolts in the 1840s started with the Chartists in Britain.

Egypt was the next to feel the wrath of a dissatisfied people. Change happened over a period of weeks, as various measures were tried and found wanting by a population wanting wholesale regime change rather than just dismissing the odd minister.

In fact, there had been resistance for years but it took the Tunisian experience to catalyse it into the violent clashes, mass striking and constant demonstrating that eventually ensued. By February 11, even President Mubarak had seen the writing on the wall and resigned. Since then, things appear to have stayed calm (touch wood) pending discussions on how to ensure the reduced repression and application of a stronger democratic structure demanded by the population. Events have demonstrated that the old regimes cannot be replaced like for like and that something new is needed - and not just in Egypt.

15 other countries in the Arab world have featured protests - or more than protests - since Tunisia's revolution began. These had been going on for six weeks before the F1 world noticed, for Bahrain looked to be among the most stable of the Arab nations.

Bahrain has a prosperous economy and has had democratic institutions in its constitution for a decade. The trouble was that many people, particularly among the Shia, had not had their fortunes uplifted in line with those of their nation and the institutions are easily overruled by the King and other members of the royal family. The protestors tried to keep the sectarianism out of the equation but the government still saw a sectarian threat, which increased tensions. There were also complaints about the number of political prisoners in Bahrain. The success of the Egyptian revolt in particular inspired the dissatisfied to action.

The King paid 1000 Bahraini dinars (£615.10) to every citizen in the country on February 14, the 10-year anniversary of the constitution that should have ensured the democratic institutions were powerful. It is rumoured that this was an attempt to head off the demonstrations. If so, it failed. On February 14, there was a mass occupation of the streets across Bahrain. One protester died, but it was his funeral next day that turned the situation from a purely political problem to one that involved the motorsport community.

Police fired at the funeral procession, killing one person, injuring 25 and pushing thousands into believing the powers-that-be had abandoned them. It was into the resulting bloodstained fury that the GP2 Asia circus entered the country. Will Buxton vividly described the situation in the country on the relatively quiet day before first practise was due to begin. The reports from others indicated that increasing amounts of violence were being employed by the police and army, a tactic which never helps calmness of people or encourage stability of government. The official position attempted to reassure foreigners that they were still safe in Bahrain, but increasingly people were having doubts.

Practise itself started with the ART and iSport teams playing football against each other because the medical staff due to support the race's requirements were recalled to Manama to assist the injured. The riot police had started using live bullets in addition to the tear gas and batons used previously. Clearly, it was dangerous for the GP2 Asia people to remain in Manama and there was no prospect of getting the medical staff back in time to run the race anyway. This was sufficient reason for the FIA's Bahrain branch to cancel the race, using Article 1.3 of Appendix O of the International Sporting Code:

"Recommendations regarding the number of personnel should be complied with throughout the event; if it is not possible... ...the programme of the event should be rearranged".

The press release was rather less verbose, but it posed a clear message to F1. If Bahrain could not safely host a GP2 race, what chance a F1 test two weeks later - or indeed the F1 race a week after that? Many people on the internet were arguing against going to Bahrain, and not because of the complaints of previous years concerning low overtaking opportunities and general blandness. The violence in the region is ongoing, despite the Crown Prince's pleas for calm and orders for the army to leave Manama having resulted in an entire day without bloodshed.

Insurance for many people in the F1 paddock is currently invalid with respect to travel to Bahrain, and is likely to remain so unless and until the various international travel advisers are assured the current peace is permanent. Sponsors may be reluctant to associate themselves with the country for the time being. Nick Heidfeld, one of the more thoughtful drivers on the F1 grid, has urged sensitivity - a level-headed approach, but is there time between now and the point where visa applications and freight transportation demand an answer?

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph? What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East? Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future? Oh, and is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

I hope to answer these in my next blog entry. Until then, I leave you with a link to a comment I made on F1 Fanatic that may convince you that F1 - whatever it does - cannot be truly apolitical about this.

This weekend, Viva F1 has organised the third Blogger's Swap Shop. It is a fantastic idea where 15 motorsports bloggers write for each other's blogs. An entry from me will appear at The Formula 1 & Motorsports Archive today. La Canta Magnifico Blog is honoured to host a guest entry by Maverick of Viva F1 (please ignore the entry by-line as I haven't figured out how to get it to change yet).

Formula One has more than its fair share of rules. There's not even a single rule book - please refer to the International Sporting code, F1 Sporting Regulations and F1 Technical Regulations as well as all the attached appendices while not forgetting the Rules of the FIA International Court of Appeal [and the Concorde Agreement - ed]. Undoubtedly the vaguest of all the rules, and quite deliberately so, is Article 151c which concerns "any fraudulent conduct or any act prejudicial to the interests of any competition or to the interests of motor sport generally." In other words, ‘bringing the sport into disrepute’.

The ‘disrepute clause’ gives rise to concerns not only about its ill-defined and wide-reaching nature but also about its potential for abuse. So vague is the clause, who is to define what is and what isn't against the interests of the sport? Furthermore, having lost the case, while there is scope to challenge the decision in the Court of Appeal how can you possibly argue that it didn't bring the sport into disrepute? It's an immeasurable concept. Taking a case even further, with notable exceptions, the courts are generally reluctant to intervene in the internal disputes of voluntary associations and not inclined to review the decisions of tribunals.

Last month, the FIA scrapped the team orders rule but with the caveat that "any actions liable to bring the sport into disrepute are dealt with under Article 151c of the International Sporting Code and any other relevant provisions". So are team orders banned? Ferrari's decision to manipulate Michael Schumacher past Rubens Barrichello on the last lap of the 2002 Austrian Grand Prix induced boos from the watching spectators and widespread condemnation from the media. It ultimately led to the banning of team orders, but how would it be dealt with today? It clearly sounds like a case of bringing the 'sport into into disrepute' but at the time, the WMSC "recognised the long-standing and traditional right of a team to decree the finishing order of its drivers in what it believes to be the best interest of its attempt to win both world championships" and hence took no action. Does tradition trump public opinion?

Moving onto 2010 and Hockenheim and this time it was Felipe Massa who was giving way for Fernando Alonso. The stewards acted by issuing the maximum fine allowed to them but the WMSC chose to not extend the penalty, instead going as far as recommending that the ban on team orders be abolished, which it subsequently was. However, what about bringing the sport into disrepute? There was uproar amongst groups of fans and the media, so was there a case for turning to Article 151c? The trouble is that while large parts of the media were unhappy (the Brazilian castigation of Massa being particularly venomous) it certainly wasn't the case everywhere. The Italian media sided with Ferrari, the Spanish media sided with Alonso and the German media, seemingly conditioned by the Schumacher-years, coolly seemed to think that it was business as usual - which in reality it probably was.

Another example from 2010, which might have resulted in Article 151c being brandished in anger, was Ferrari's and Alonso's claims that the European Grand Prix was fixed. If this was football there would have been repercussions - earlier this week, Liverpool's Ryan Babel picked up a £10,000 fine for retweeting a link to a mocked-up picture of referee Howard Webb in a Manchester United shirt after Liverpool lost 1-0 to their rivals. The stewards may have done a poor job that weekend but for drivers and teams at the centre of it all to suggest bias at the FIA could easily be seen as damaging to Formula One.

On the other hand, others may suggest that it was the actual stewarding that was damaging - which begs the question of whether the FIA themselves should be able to be found guilty of ‘bringing the sport into disrepute’? While many fans have been suggesting that for years, the nearest anyone on the inside has come to suggesting such a thing in recent years is in 2008, when Mark Webber accused Max Mosley of damaging the sport following allegations about his private life.

In the end, the Hockenheim result is forgotten largely thanks to a combination of a close-fought Championship and the fact that Alonso didn't take the title thanks to those points gained in Germany. How might the issue have rumbled on down the years if 'Alonso's title' had been questioned by some? Of course, one whole problem with the question of ‘bringing the sport into disrepute’ is that public exposure is central to the accusation and yet, by simply pursuing an issue, the FIA can generate even more publicity for a case, causing further damage. Yet, does it all really matter?

Formula One thrives on controversy, the politics is as much a part of the drama as the racing - an ongoing soap opera. Admittedly, the politics occasionally takes too much precedence over what is happening on the track (Max Mosley and FOTA's wranglings at the end of his reign being a prime example). Yet has any of it really damaged F1's reputation? Renault were found guilty of manipulating a race but fans never stayed away from the subsequent Singapore Grand Prix. McLaren were found guilty of stealing Ferrari information but Formula One is still seen as a glamorous sport. In short, the concept of the ‘disrepute clause’ seems like a misnomer as far as Formula One is concerned. Perhaps it comes down to that image of glamour - a bit of palace intrigue is expected to be part and parcel of the show?

But then maybe Bernie Ecclestone already knows that - a man who could probably earn himself three or four disrepute charges a year.