This entry has taken me some time to figure out how to write. Something's been bugging me about recent F1, primarily since the Turkish Grand Prix. However, it was only when Duncan Stephen wrote his item on why he was finding 2011-spec F1 not to his taste that I figured out how to write my own objections to what's been going on. My first reaction to the piece was:

Hurrah! Somebody doesn't think that the current F1 is a) the bee's knees or b) only ruined by excess overtaking.

For me the proximate problem (i.e. the one that's directly causing me dissatisfaction with F1) is meaningless overtaking. In Turkey in particular, the method of generation of overtaking caused lots of zero-sum exchanges - lots of passes but most of them were never going to affect anything in a month of Sundays. They were just going to get re-passed later in the corner sequence or else in the DRS zone the following lap.

DRS foreshortens the process of passing even when it's producing a reasonable net increase of overtaking. This makes it less skilful and also less significant in the context of a race. Those comparing Turkey 2011 to Japan 2005 have forgotten, among other things, that many of the overtaking moves in the latter took laps to set up. Yes, it was normal for cars to be innately 1-2 seconds faster or slower than each other that year, making things difficult enough for complaints, but that still shows planning and skill were important.

If pressing buttons is the new hot skill for F1, why aren't all the F1 drivers being sent on evening typing courses? Why aren't fit typists with clean driving licences being considered for F1 testing roles over the heads of those who have toiled in F3 and GP2?

Besides all that, DRS should never have been experimented with in a race weekend. It should have been tested properly prior to use, and then implemented equally and effectively in all races.

Despite the emphasis on changes to the racing, qualifying has now become the be- and end-all of F1. The only reason it's not become the only non-accidental deciding factor is because many teams haven't worked out it's merely a question of getting your single lap per session faster than those around you. It's no longer possible to waste tyres doing two runs. If you're first into the first corner, DRS means you'll be able to pull out a big lead and protect your tyres as you will while everyone battles behind you. I felt like kicking Lewis Hamilton and Jenson Button when they did their little duel at the start; by focusing on each other they lost time to Sebastian Vettel and wore out their tyres, which made it impossible for either to do anything about the race leader.

That's right, to get exciting racing for the lead in this system you need a team to qualify both its drivers right behind the lead one (without the pole-sitter's team-mate or any other team being in between) and then execute firm team orders on lap 1 to stop them from attempting to race each other. The "no. 2" would be tasked with staying 1.1 seconds ahead of 4th place and then keeping a consistent pace to remain 1.1 seconds ahead of 4th place, preserving the invisible barrier. "Good" thing systematic team orders are permitted this year, else every race win would be unsalvageable.

If you're not a potential race winner, qualifying is still vital and still has to be done as a single-lap run for each of the three sessions. This would be one set of tyres for Q1 and Q2 and then a second set for whichever session is believed to be the final one. If you get through to Q3 when it wasn't expected, simply sit out the session to preserve your strategy. This is because if you can't look after your tyres, the best strategy is to have as many new ones as possible. If you can do that, it's irrelevant whether you can pass the people around you (with gimmicks or not) because you'll probably gain a pit stop on them - especially if your car is relatively kind to tyres like the Sauber is). Even if you don't, you'll gain considerable amounts of time and flexibility.

It's bizarre that the strategies dictated by fragile tyres and ease of DRS-based tactics mean that the act of passing - DRS-based or otherwise - is almost irrelevant to the results.

The trick is to evenly space out all tyre changes according to when your car will need them, which should be quite straightforward to determine based upon performance in the first stint. It doesn't even need anyone to bother doing a pre-race equation - it's simply a question of chucking tyres at a car when it needs them. Pit strategy outside the options a car may deny has now got so little relevance that the discretionary laps can be deployed whenever the team wishes. All the strategy divergence is down to two factors: a) due to the tyre philosophy being new, different cars treat them very differently and b) many teams do not appear to have figured out what's going on yet, so haven't even taken the obvious step of going single-lap each session up to this point.

So we now have the single-lap qualifying some people have called for. It's not improving the racing - it's taken it away. Duncan Stephen has called it "one step away from fixing the result". I wish I could be so reserved on the matter. As far as I can see, it is fixing the result to whoever happens to be the fastest one-run driver/car combination in qualifying, and for most of the top 10, stupidity and extreme tyre wear permitting, they are fixed in the positions in which they qualified.

KERS doesn't seem to do anything to help the sport - it just seems to be something tagged on to keep the stupider elements of the environmental movement a little more content. It's in F1 in a form that will never be utilised on the road (road KERS will be a very gentle addition for all accelerations, not a big boost done occasionally), delivering power in a way that makes overtaking more difficult (which may be protecting us from even worse problems with DRS) and with a lack of freedom which places it firmly in "gimmick" rather than the "feature" it is about to become in sportscar racing. That it's not facing a campaign for removal at this time shows just how much of a problem DRS presents.

One of the things which worries me - and I think it's one of the things that's made it difficult for me to blog - is that so many people don't seem to see the medium-sized picture let alone the big one. They see lots of passing, lots of energy, lots of confusion - and start cheering. They do not see that it's causing very predictable strategies, very predictable results and a very samey feel to races. Energy and confusion might have got many into the sport but if it had kept being those things at the expense of everything else - especially the surprise element - they'd have stopped watching within a season because there'd be nothing to grip them with. If I wanted to know the winner 24 hours before the race and the result of a race for most of the field on lap 15, I'd put on a season review DVD. At least then there'd be decent camera direction...

Sport is a form of entertainment. If done properly, it will be entertaining whether or not the "show" is considered (the "show" only affects how many people get entertained and the length of the entertaining). The decade-long trend towards considering "show" over "sport" is nearly complete. But F1 is not reality TV. Reality TV tropes do not necessarily work for sports such as F1, even with extreme tweaking. The cost is that F1 will soon be unable to be called the pinnacle of motor sport, on the grounds that it will not be a sport at all. The sport needs urgent attention in order to save it, to take away the worst of the gimmicks. That way it might be possible to see how to get the enjoyment of racing to run clear again.

Though I'll let the powers-that-be tweak the "show" enough to get a competent TV direction system and crew. The current one hasn't worked since FOM took over the job and 2011 is exposing their weaknesses so much. It's even more frustrating to be watching a predictable race when perfectly competent commentators, used to having at least vaguely usable images to commentate from, find themselves clueless to things you figured out 30 laps before because you, unlike them, could see the little ticker-tape running across the bottom of the screen...

Warning! Long entry alert!

I've been thinking what to write for this for most of the week. Normally F1 tackles politics by avoiding it with a 10-foot bargepole; Bernie focuses on the almighty [insert currency here] and the FIA is apolitical by statute.

The events of the past week in the Middle East have prevented the possibility of solution through ignorance.

First of all, some background. The chain of events that led to the current FCO travel advice not to go to Bahrain unless strictly necessary started in December 2010 over in Tunisia. The recession, poor living conditions, corruption and dissatisfaction with a lack of political freedoms resulted in a population ripe for turning into a mob.

The eventual spark that ignited the fire of rebelliousness was caused by a dispute over a vegetable cart licence. Cart owner Mohamed Bouazizi, after apparently being assaulted by a police officer and unsuccessfully attempting to get the local police station to hear his complaint, set himself on fire in protest. The people, for the most part, sided with the cart owner. Initial protests concerning his treatment by the police were met with tear gas, obstructionism and a "quasi-curfew".

The people increased their demands in response, eventually demanding the removal from government of the entire ruling party (RCD) and release of political prisoners. Even a reformation of the government with a reduced number of RCD members did nothing to quell the uprising. Eventually the army sided with the protesters and mass resignations followed.

This Sidi Bouzid Revolt triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East. Most of the world is currently in recession, but many if not most countries in the Middle East are characterised with various types of authoritarian regime. While the majority have democratic layers, there have been as many ways of implementing them as there are countries.

Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with corruption and generate nations of layered societies.As Frank Herbert correctly noted, "The layered society is an invitation to violence". This is because each layer tends to envy, covet and/or despise the other layers, resulting in rampant power abuse. In turn, a desire is created to take what rightfully belongs to others, which remains undisclosed and unsatisfied due to fear of said power abuse and the lack of incentive for the powerful to enable uncontrolled social movement.

The countries of the Middle East have shared a bond with one another since Islam first united their common ideologies. They have also experienced common changes that have made them more vulnerable to a tidal change in popular thinking. The average population has slowly become younger, therefore less likely to think conservatively or in accord with the opinions of their elders. They have been typically better-educated than before; in many of the Middle Eastern countries, agriculture has become less important as more highly-skilled services such as banking and business administration have increased in importance.

Oil, which has slowed the transition from agriculture to service-based industry, is becoming less important as it is increasingly clear the resource is finite. Many of the countries which had oil have diversified successfully, but it has broadened horizons.

Most importantly, many people are engaging with the internet and social media - which are proving more difficult to censor than more traditional communication channels. Newspapers, broadcast channels and even static web sites can easily be influenced by rulers in their home nation should they be so inclined. Trying to influence thousands or even millions of individual connections and accounts across multiple networks, many of which aren't even in the Middle East, has proven vastly more complicated.

The reduced censorship has not only emboldened people but provided easier access in materials on how to voice their complaints. Non-violent manuals easily downloadable (PDF) from the internet have contributed to the ability of protest organisers to make their protests effective. People who have been involved in previous protests can share their expertise.

Furthermore, it is easier for the people to give direct accounts of what they believe to the world and for the world to answer back. Most of the traffic on social networks consists of spam, banter and matters of relatively minor importance (in approximately that order). However, it is also possible for a large number of people to give the same message to those involved in political strife. It reminds those people that the world is watching. It can help people remember that those people have standards and thus utilise peer pressure to modify behaviour. It can demonstrate the failure of censorship and the politics of fear. It can even encourage normally-apathetic people to engage with the issues of the day, thus increasing pressure on the governments not directly involved to state their stance and bring their great powers to bear.

All this provided a highly unstable backdrop; the governments of many Middle Eastern countries simply hadn't adapted to the changes enforced by the passing of time. Protest dominoes suddenly looked likely, just as Gdańsk had become the trigger for the downfall of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and pan-European revolts in the 1840s started with the Chartists in Britain.

Egypt was the next to feel the wrath of a dissatisfied people. Change happened over a period of weeks, as various measures were tried and found wanting by a population wanting wholesale regime change rather than just dismissing the odd minister.

In fact, there had been resistance for years but it took the Tunisian experience to catalyse it into the violent clashes, mass striking and constant demonstrating that eventually ensued. By February 11, even President Mubarak had seen the writing on the wall and resigned. Since then, things appear to have stayed calm (touch wood) pending discussions on how to ensure the reduced repression and application of a stronger democratic structure demanded by the population. Events have demonstrated that the old regimes cannot be replaced like for like and that something new is needed - and not just in Egypt.

15 other countries in the Arab world have featured protests - or more than protests - since Tunisia's revolution began. These had been going on for six weeks before the F1 world noticed, for Bahrain looked to be among the most stable of the Arab nations.

Bahrain has a prosperous economy and has had democratic institutions in its constitution for a decade. The trouble was that many people, particularly among the Shia, had not had their fortunes uplifted in line with those of their nation and the institutions are easily overruled by the King and other members of the royal family. The protestors tried to keep the sectarianism out of the equation but the government still saw a sectarian threat, which increased tensions. There were also complaints about the number of political prisoners in Bahrain. The success of the Egyptian revolt in particular inspired the dissatisfied to action.

The King paid 1000 Bahraini dinars (£615.10) to every citizen in the country on February 14, the 10-year anniversary of the constitution that should have ensured the democratic institutions were powerful. It is rumoured that this was an attempt to head off the demonstrations. If so, it failed. On February 14, there was a mass occupation of the streets across Bahrain. One protester died, but it was his funeral next day that turned the situation from a purely political problem to one that involved the motorsport community.

Police fired at the funeral procession, killing one person, injuring 25 and pushing thousands into believing the powers-that-be had abandoned them. It was into the resulting bloodstained fury that the GP2 Asia circus entered the country. Will Buxton vividly described the situation in the country on the relatively quiet day before first practise was due to begin. The reports from others indicated that increasing amounts of violence were being employed by the police and army, a tactic which never helps calmness of people or encourage stability of government. The official position attempted to reassure foreigners that they were still safe in Bahrain, but increasingly people were having doubts.

Practise itself started with the ART and iSport teams playing football against each other because the medical staff due to support the race's requirements were recalled to Manama to assist the injured. The riot police had started using live bullets in addition to the tear gas and batons used previously. Clearly, it was dangerous for the GP2 Asia people to remain in Manama and there was no prospect of getting the medical staff back in time to run the race anyway. This was sufficient reason for the FIA's Bahrain branch to cancel the race, using Article 1.3 of Appendix O of the International Sporting Code:

"Recommendations regarding the number of personnel should be complied with throughout the event; if it is not possible... ...the programme of the event should be rearranged".

The press release was rather less verbose, but it posed a clear message to F1. If Bahrain could not safely host a GP2 race, what chance a F1 test two weeks later - or indeed the F1 race a week after that? Many people on the internet were arguing against going to Bahrain, and not because of the complaints of previous years concerning low overtaking opportunities and general blandness. The violence in the region is ongoing, despite the Crown Prince's pleas for calm and orders for the army to leave Manama having resulted in an entire day without bloodshed.

Insurance for many people in the F1 paddock is currently invalid with respect to travel to Bahrain, and is likely to remain so unless and until the various international travel advisers are assured the current peace is permanent. Sponsors may be reluctant to associate themselves with the country for the time being. Nick Heidfeld, one of the more thoughtful drivers on the F1 grid, has urged sensitivity - a level-headed approach, but is there time between now and the point where visa applications and freight transportation demand an answer?

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph? What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East? Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future? Oh, and is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

I hope to answer these in my next blog entry. Until then, I leave you with a link to a comment I made on F1 Fanatic that may convince you that F1 - whatever it does - cannot be truly apolitical about this.