The F1 circus going to Bahrain on the FIA's orders despite this contravening the FIA's own Statutes (more detail in the "UniFacepalm" entry) for those who are interested) and then being further in breach due to one of Force India's hire cars being attacked despite safety reassurances from the FIA. This means the event technically doesn't meet Article 17 of the International Sporting Code any more. This in turn means that F1 cars can no longer partake of the race, if Article 5.2 of the Sporting Regulations is anything to go by. As such, there are two very good regulatory reasons why F1 cannot race in Bahrain.

In light of the above, the F1 race, by the FIA's own regulations, should not be happening at all. Therefore I intend to ignore all sporting aspects of the Bahrain weekend. There will be no live-commenting on Twitter or the Fisichella Forum (as I normally provide), nor will I comment on any aspect of any driver's on-track performance.

Discussions of non-sporting aspects of F1, and of non-F1 events, will continue as normal and appropriate.

I hope this is OK with everyone and apologise to anyone who is inconvenienced by this service interruption/boycott. Non-F1 items are unaffected by this boycott, and I intend to resume live-commenting F1 events in Spain and (possibly) the Mugello test beforehand, subject to the FIA not breaking any regulations in the course of going there.

First of all, sorry for the long absence. I've had a lengthy spell where everything I've wanted to write has been either live-commenting or small enough to fit in a tweet or two. Neither fits my blogging style. I'll try not to let 10-week absences happen again.

Fury ignited this entry. It's the ongoing situation in Bahrain. Up until now, it's been a matter of ethics and safety whether F1 goes or not. Thanks to the Bahrain organiser's actions, it's become a matter of regulations.

I speak of the "UniF1ed" campaign - something which apparently has been happening for a while but only came to my attention last night.  The organisers of the race may or may not have originated the campaign, but they are enthusiastically participating in it. Little do they appear to realise that they have endangered their race by doing so.

I draw your attention to the tagline "One Nation in Celebration". The pedants among you will deem this false - F1 is a worldwide event so, barring disaster, "Many Nations In Celebration" would be more accurate. The font used for it on the poster is difficult to read, but that's even more nit-picky. The big problem, however, is that it expresses a link between F1 and national unity. 

Linking F1 and national unity probably doesn't seem that big a problem. It may even seem close enough to pro-social and "sport is good" themes to be helpful. I can only assume that was what the organisers thought when they decided to go down that path. Unfortunately for them, Article 1 of the FIA Statutes (PDF), in wording combined with its application and the reason for its existence, indicates otherwise.

Article 1 of the FIA Statutes says, among other things:

"The FIA shall refrain from manifesting racial, political or religious discrimination in the course of its activities and from taking any action in this respect."

Many thanks to the Midweek Motorsports Listener Collective on Facebook, particularly with regard to finding an ad in the campaign that further demonstrates the link the organisers are making between F1 and politics.

You may be wondering why I am using "linking F1 and politics" as synonymous with the "racial, political and religious discrimination" actually mentioned in Article 1 of the FIA Statutes. This is down to two things: the way Article 1 has been implemented and the reason Article 1 is required to exist.

The most recent use of Article 1  was to convict the Turkish GP organisers (TOSFED) of using the 2006 podium ceremony for political gain. Mehmet Ali Talat presented one of the trophies. This in and of itself wasn't a breach of Article 1. Had he been described as the regional governor of Turkish Cyprus, everything would have been fine (except for possible grumblings within Cyprus and Turkey). However, he was described as the head of state of the Republic of Cyprus, a state not recognised by the UN but is recognised by Turkey. That was deemed a breach of Article 1 of the FIA Statutes and of Article 151c of the International Sporting Code. This was for a one-off incident that was relatively subtle in its political aims and, importantly, did not connote political discrimination, only express a controversial political point. 

Yes, part of the fine was for Article 151c, but a more significant breach of Article 1 would be sufficient for any penalty the FIA has to be levied. The "UniF1ed" campaign is clearly not a casual breach, nor is it a question of tick-boxing. Article 35 b) specifically mentions that any club not acting according to the expectations of the FIA (including by breaking any of the Statutes) can be struck off the roll. That is to say, the entire club and all associated activities can be dissolved. Obviously, this would include the very Grand Prix Bahrain was attempting to protect.

There is nothing in the Statute that requires a political statement to be true or demonstrable in order for it to be usable. Technically speaking, even explicit FIA approval wouldn't work, unless the message was specifically against racial, political or religious discrimination. "UniF1ed" isn't. Instead it is a message suggesting political unity already exists, which doesn't meet the exemption requirement. 

As for why Article 1 of the FIA Statutes exists, it's mandatory for non-political organisations registered in France. This is because anti-discrimination and apolitical approaches are considered key elements in the sorts of groups France allows to be registered with them. If the FIA overlooks a breach of Article 1, it is under serious risk of being sent to the French civil courts and penalised. Dissolution is entirely possible, as is a large fine and (at least partial) loss of its autonomy over judging its own motorsports events.

That would open the door to everything from pitlane speeders to technical flouters to use the civil courts to challenge every single decision the FIA makes. Motorsport would grind to a halt. That assumes a lack of dissolution - that scenario would obviously have a serious deletrious effect on every branch of motorsport, including ones that never in a million years considered going to Bahrain.

Clearly none of this is in any motorsport fan's interest. It certainly doesn't help Bahrain organisers any! 

There is no longer any need to reference political strife or anyone's safety to justify not going to Bahrain. Regulations now demand refusal to race - and refusal to support the race. Many have suggested this be done in the form of a boycott.

Thanks to the combined efforts of Sky (inaccessible, unaffordable and unethical) and BBC Radio (unintelligible in the races), I won't have a choice about watching the race. The most I'd have been able to do was follow it on Twitter. Having already had the difficult bit taken out of my hands, I am quite happy to boycott the 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix completely. The powers-that-be have already demonstrated they don't care about viewer figures due to sending the UK live rights to Sky, so I doubt the boycott will achieve anything. 

For that matter, I'm not convinced the situation is safe enough to enable a viable attempt to hold the 2012 Bahrain GP. If inviability makes for a race cancellation on force majuere (which incidentally has to be done by the FIA if there is to be a Bahrain 2013), that would be helpful in the short term.

The breach of Statute would make the validity of copyright use of "F1" within "UniF1ed" questionable too. The licence the organisers have to include F1 in their marketing would surely not include uses in materials breaching the regulations, particularly ones underpinned by law. Some of the cases Bernie has lost on the topic mean there is not sufficient evidence for certainty in either direction. Even so, that wouldn't be Bahrain's biggest likely problem.

Its biggest problem in that scenario is that Bahrain would likely lose the race... ...on account of there being no viable authority to contract the race from in the first place. 

For these reasons, it is wrong to support a race that's being used to support political strife in contravention of Article 1 of the FIA Statutes. As in, it's such a big contravention that, at minimum, the FIA will lose its ability to be the first and final place of judgment for matters involving its own series (everything would have to be made subject to the French civil courts). The French courts are rather sensitive about the whole "no politics" thing for non-political organisations. The moment Bahrain's organisers issued the "UniF1ed" ad campaign, it was in contravention of the regulations. That the FIA has (so far) let that campaign go ahead without comment is contemptible and puts the FIA - and every single series it runs, including those who'd never have gone to Bahrain in a million years - in a very vulnerable position.

It's in F1's and the FIA's interest not to wait for force majuere to come into effect, but to protect themselves by cancelling on the grounds of FIA Statute Article 1 breaches.

Until then... ...I don't see why I should have to applaud or condone the FIA's attempted self-destruction.

Following a rather odd conversation on The Formula 1 Blog with Anonymous, it is becoming increasingly clear that a breakdown of what it would take for Sky to break even is necessary. This is, after all, the main reason why the attempt to transfer the UK rights from free-to-air to pay-TV is likely to have medium-term consequences on non-UK F1 fans. It's a bit rough-and-ready because of the timing, but I will happily tidy up anything that you think needs tidying later.

Wimbledon never fails to get full crowds even though few people in Britain follow tennis otherwise. Silverstone never failed to get full crowds even in years where British F1 figures fell like a stone due to Schumacher dominating. You'd be surprised at how low an audience conversion is needed to fill a stadium, so saying that test cricket grounds are still full doesn't say anything about what's going on with the TV side of things. Attending a cricket match is a special occasion. It does not mean that watching cricket is still bread-and-butter to people. The BARB statistics do not lie and they say that Sky struggles to get a seventh of the audience Radio 4 Longwave does for cricket matches, and that both combined are far lower than cricket got before Sky took over. The numbers end up working for the sport largely because Sky can afford more, but that is reliant on capping the level sports can charge it. That works financially for sports that seriously undervalued themselves (primarily by only considering the BBC pre-Sky, which of course can't run adverts to offset its expenses) but F1 hasn't done that since 1981...

I suppose if one calls 234,000 rugby viewers (2008 League World Cup) with Sky compared to over 2.6 million for the previous version* pre-Sky a success, then rugby might be considered a success. From Sky's perspective, it's a relatively successful sport because the low sanctioning fees means it can make quite a bit from the deal; from the perspective of a rational outsider surveying the effects on the sport's support base, it is a disaster.

The more one looks at the effects of Sky getting involved in sport, the worse it looks for sport. If a sport wants to go from being a majority sport to a minor one, going the pay route's a pretty effective way of doing it. That's been demonstrated time and again.


Advertising is of course part of Sky's arsenal when paying for things. However, Bernie fees are not the only costs it faces, and F1 isn't football. It costs £10 m per year to produce F1 the BBC 2011 way and to do all the extra features Sky has said it'll do, it will need to spend even more than that. ITV couldn't get that much from sponsorship when it had F1 in boom time, so given that Sky isn't having in-race advertising and is operating in a recession, it'll struggle to even meet its production costs through advertising, let alone start tackling marketing, satellite rearrangement fees (yes, making a new channel costs money) and the Bernie fee (which is now four times higher for Sky than the BBC's production fee was). 

Even so, my original calculation of a million new customers being needed assumed, optimistically, that the non-Bernie fees would be entirely covered by advertising. (Before the amount Sky paid was announced, I tended to say "between 0.5 and 0.88 million" when commenting on the internet; I was bargaining on Sky doing some sort of cost calculation prior to purchase). The £40 m from subscriptions prior to F1's arrival has to be ignored on the grounds that they'll have bought other contracts with them. These naturally must be maintained, with the possible exception of programs that directly clash with F1 programming. Other sports may not be as expensive as F1 but they do have acquisition and production fees. Instead, the calculation has to be done from base.

There are two ways of getting Sky F1 - one using the HD pack and the other using Sky Sports. The Entertainment pack cost (common to both routes) has to be ignored because the channels on the pack are funded by it, along with all their programming. Much like the BBC, each Sky channel is funded separately. Terra Nova, for example, is not a free show. Even through the HD route, the HD money is not free because all the programming on Sky has to be converted to HD. If Entertainment and Sports are priced in relation to their values to Sky, then only half the HD top-up can be assumed to be available for F1.

Let's assume that the only sport that the people are interested in is F1 and that HD buyers don't buy any other packages (if we don't, again, the figures look even worse for Sky, as that person's subscription fee would then need to be shared among however many additional contracts corresponded to that individual's customised viewing habits). The cost of Sky Sports 1 and 2 on top of that package is £20 and this is the maximum amount Sky can take in per customer per month with regard to F1. HD, once the half for Entertainment package upgrading is removed, only contributes £6.125 per customer. Only new-to-Sky customers can be assumed to be taking the package for the full 12 months, so only the 7 months where Sky has an exclusive race can be safely counted for Sky's revenue (let's assume for now that Bahrain goes ahead).

I am also going to assume that everyone who watches F1 is a singleton who never has the TV on when entertaining and doesn't have lodgers or other unrelated co-residents similar sneakily "borrowing" a chair during races. Otherwise, each viewer is only contributing part of the subscription payment. I'm also assuming none of these people are bar, pub or club owners because then every patron of the bar/pub/club is contributing towards the subscription.

Remember that the Bernie escalator ensures that prices go up at least 10% every year (that fee quoted for Sky's acquisition will be the first-year price; Bernie rules ensure it goes up and up after that). The £40 m initial annual price becomes £77.95 m by the end of the contract Sky has. If that sounds high, the fee the BBC paid went from £25 m to £40 m a year from one end of its contract to the other (projected but never reached due to renegotiation) end; if it hadn't it probably wouldn't have needed to let F1 go. That's compounding for you.

At the moment, 30% of Sky customers are on HD (therefore using the cheap route) and 70% on SD (therefore would need the expensive route). Being optimistic and assuming this proportion does not move any further towards HD despite more HD subscribers being in Sky's overall business plan, Sky needs 0.95 million new subscribers (rounds up to 1 million to the nearest 100,000 subscribers) that didn't care for any Sky-carried sport bar F1. To break even. Compounding means it doesn't have to get them all immediately - a 2012 figure of 0.53 million is enough for that specific year - but Sky's sales definitely aren't going up by the 10% per year needed simply to keep up with Bernie (they only increased by 3% per year for the last 2 years - it's pretty consistent at the moment). 

Even 0.53 million is over twice as many viewers than Sky gets for any part of its non-football programming. It is unlikely Sky will get the figures it needs because past and present data demonstrates it. This is before considering that every assumption I've just detailed here - advertising revenue, house occupancy, HD, caring about other Sky sports, Bahrain, the extent of Bernie escalator - is more likely to go against Sky than in its favour with regard to making F1 pay, and therefore require even more people to sign.

(For the curious, on the assumptions made in this item, it would take 2.08 m cumulative new customers for Sky to be able to justify taking all 20 races in the first year of the next broadcasting contract of 2018, assuming the minimum number of new customers were signed up as needed to let it break even in each previous year, that no additional fee was made for exclusivity and assuming Sky merely wished to break even with F1 due to its high profile).

Japan F1 is mostly free Fuji TV. There is a pay option (Next) but it gets 1/6 of the audience the free version does (helped by the fact the same provider on the same platform shows the free and pay options - not the case in the UK). Brazil is primarily covered by GloboTV, which is free-to-air and easily beats the pay option for popularity. Italy and Germany used to have pay TV options (through Sky) but they've folded due to lack of interest. Some other countries with smaller audiences have pay-only, and their audiences went through the floor. This has left some channels dropping F1 altogether and others putting it on progressively higher-cost options. That's what always happens with pay TV concerning sports that were previously shown just fine on free-to-air**. The audiences shrink and so the pay TV provider has to rely on cheap rates to keep the option alive. Here's a hint: Bernie will never, ever, provide cheap rates.

So why are the likes of rugby and cricket succeeding despite their TV mistakes? Because other avenues of revenue exploded in the last decade or two. Sponsorship, once quite rare for a series, has become huge money, especially for drinks companies who would struggle to advertise in certain international markets through the standard methods. Ticket prices skyrocketed, turning the weekly patronage of a favourite sport to an occasional treat for the poor without turning away the rich (in fact, with more focus on rich clients as seen in the past decade, the rich are pouring in as they spy networking and hob-nobbing opportunities). The sponsorship alone accounts for why there's more money in disability swimming than ever despite it having no media profile worthy of the name and free tickets to nearly all events. The latter is why the Paddock Club in F1 is worth over 10% of the total income of F1 despite serving a maximum of 5000 people per race.

After all is calculated, Sky's chances of making F1 break even are remote. The chances of Sky keeping a sport that doesn't break even is even remoter. The chances of Bernie finding anyone willing to pay more than Sky pay him now in those circumstances is nil. That means Britain's fees will drop. It's not clear who'd pick up the rights then - it depends who has most to spare at that moment out of the not-recently-"burned" parties. What is clear is that it would cause a domino effect. Other countries would see that pay TV does not work and be able to call Bernie's bluff by not engaging in bidding wars with such channels. It would mean the prices paid by channels would fall through the floor. So would F1's revenues.

F1 would have to either seriously tighten its belt (and hope it's no longer up to the neck in debt) or die.

Quite how not want F1 to kill itself counts as "not loving F1", as Anonymous alleged, remains a mystery.  

* - In case you're wondering, rugby union suffered even worse. The Heineken Cup final, for example went from 9 million in 2005 to below 185,000 in 2007. The only reason it's still on Sky is because the Heineken Cup charges much, much less for its tournament broadcast rights than Bernie does and the BBC is currently trying to sell sports rights rather than buy them.

** - Football, in case you're wondering, was not shown fine free-to-air before Sky got the rights; the BBC could typically only show one match a day - and hardly ever in primetime - due to broadcasting balance requirements, whereas Sky was able to show multiple ones, at any time of day, almost immediately. Being able to see twice as many matches means twice as many people are going to be interested, so it matters less if no single match gets much in the way of viewing figures compared to free-to-air - the sheer number of matches viewable through the multi-channel, more specialised pay TV system meant that many small parts became a bigger sum than the BBC could achieve. Also, people can't advertise on the BBC, so when Britain's favourite sport went to the advertisable platform, advertisers naturally paid top dollar to be associated with the sport. Football is, economically speaking, pay TV's one big sporting success.

Warning! Long entry alert!

At the end of the last blog entry I did, Bahrain Bother 1 (Background), I asked four quite big questions:

 

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph? What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East? Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future? Oh, and is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

 

So I will now try to tackle each of these in turn, hopefully before the fate of the 2011 Bahrain Grand Prix is decided.

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph?

Well, there is always, at least in theory, danger to those who participate in F1 over and beyond the dangers inherent in the sport. I watched the excellent documentary "Graham Hill: Driven" last night, which among other things briefly discussed his death and that of a significant part of his team in an air crash travelling back from a test. Petty crime is a risk everywhere, but particularly highlighted in Brazil, where sporadic robberies involving guns occur and weaponless versions seemingly happen to at least one person in the F1 paddock every year. Even on-track protests are not unheard of, as Germany 2000, Britain 2003 and Spain 2006 demonstrate, and those can kill drivers (alongside anyone in the car's path) if done badly.

However, heading into a country where violent protests are a possibility in the very city the teams are staying is new territory. Unlike the dangers mentioned above, every member of every team is equally at risk Furthermore there is nothing anyone involved in F1 can do to reduce the risks once in the area and following travel advice.

On the other hand, plane crashes could theoretically be avoided by using less risky forms of transport. Petty crime tends to occur less to those who use safer routes, don't look like they have anything worth stealing and hire protection. The best protection against on-track protests has proven to be diligent marshals, these being the reason nobody has died from an on-track protest yet. None of these take the risks to zero, but they all help.

Speaking of travel advice, many countries on Saturday were advising not to travel unless essential. This is a state that renders standard insurance invalid. The FCO (official British travel adviser) is still advising people not to do non-essential travel, though following peaceful words from the Crown Prince and two days without bloodshed, the British embassy has re-opened for restricted service.

The F1 paddock did not sign up to the sport to be put in danger by third parties, so that sort of danger should be minimised as far as reasonably practicable. On Friday, with riotous clashes on the very roundabout many of the teams are due to stay, it was obviously not safe enough to go. Besides, previous revolutions have rarely been resolved in three weeks and uppermost in many people's minds were that three of the countries in the Middle East "protest dominoes" - Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan* have already experienced a revolution (if this is defined by ousting of governments).

However, the two days of peace make the question more difficult. Will this peace last? While some of the protesters are still refusing to come to the table, a danger exists that violence could resume. Having said that, the removal of the army from the equation has had a transformative effect on the situation.

I think, in the absence of more detailed knowledge about Bahrain, I will leave the question of whether the peace will last as an open question. The other part to this question is whether F1 can take that risk. I don't think it can - which the idealistic side of me thinks is a pity, but the pragmatic side believes is part of sensible risk management. Bahrain is in uncharted territory and F1 simply cannot afford the danger of having a lot of its people in the wrong place at the wrong time.

What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East?

When the FIA was formed, it declared itself apolitical by statute. Hence, all championships it organises are bound by the code of not favouring any form of politics over others. At the time, it was considered completely and utterly normal for a sport to disavow any interest in political matters. Sporting ethics demanded that the only ethical policy of a sport was sportsmanship.

However, since then there has been a growth in the influence of sport on matters outside its strict domain. From the point that commercialism entered sport, it became rich. Riches gave power. While no sport governs any particular state, sport is frequently used as a badge of approval by certain countries. In particular, hosting a World Cup or an Olympics is seen as proof that a country is wealthy, good at organising itself and has a form of politics acceptable to the wider world.

The hosting of a F1 race has always suggested wealth. It can suggest good organisation but doesn't necessarily have to (provided the people doing the actual race organising are skilled at it, the rest of the nation can be as disorganised as it likes). Politics is another matter.

Beyond the concept of sportsmanship (which has become gradually less important to F1 over the years), the fact that the FIA runs the series implies other ethical considerations. This is because the FIA also has a road division. F1 doesn't represent itself any more; it has become the public face of an organisation trying to decrease deaths and injuries in a wider context.

It is not entirely clear what this means for F1 yet. The many who watch F1 without regard for its wider implied political role would consider it heresy for the road safety agenda to play any part in what F1 does or where it goes. Indeed, many people reading this blog will remember the time before F1 and road safety were linked (this being one of Max Mosley's ideas in 1993).

For those in the FIA wishing to avoid interdepartmental hypocrisy, however, it implies that countries which deliberately endanger lives on the roads should be avoided by F1. Going to places where the death toll is high is not a problem because the FIA can work with such places to reduce it. If the government itself is working cross-purposes. So how does this fit into Bahrain? Well, one of the places where there were deaths in the recent protests was at the Pearl Monument in Manama. Which is a roundabout. In other words, a circular road. And if the reports are to be believed, the army - agents of the government - were responsible for at least some of those deaths.

Nonetheless, I would conclude that this should not be sufficient to exclude Bahrain from consideration as a venue. This was an isolated incident involving a situation not generally considered in the FIA's messages concerning road safety. Nobody is suggesting that Bahrain is usually that cavalier about protests, let alone road safety...

So in conclusion, F1 does have some ethical responsibilities, but those are pretty much self-imposed and not particularly relevant to the situation at hand.

Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future?

Would it be possible for F1 to persuade politicians to refrain from actions that would make it difficult for it to race in their countries? Would it be wise?

Bernie Ecclestone has repeatedly said that he is in contact with the Crown Prince of Bahrain over the matter of whether F1 is safe to go there. This indicates that, at least for Bahrain, F1 has a channel with which to attempt political influence. It is certain that at some point, Bernie will have mentioned that peace would help reassure the powers-that-be that it might be possible to race at Sakhir after all.

I do not think anyone would argue that this sort of mild influence in an emergency situation is anything other than beneficial. In fact, many people have been asking for peace in Bahrain who have rather less stake in the matter. However, it does open a question of whether this could be done in other, less urgent circumstances.

It would be tricky. The FIA, as previously mentioned, is apolitical. The fact it still is is not a random decision. It enables them to work with any country in the world. This is especially important given that they are, as previously mentioned, involved in road safety work as well as organising motor racing. If a country believes that the FIA might use politics as a reason to proffer or withhold a Grand Prix, then it is far less likely to be receptive to its views on other matters. Even countries that do get a race will be looking over their shoulders because political viewpoints change rapidly, in many of the countries in which the FIA is involved if not within any part of the F1 paddock itself.

Also, what precisely would qualify as sufficient political cause to prevent a F1 race from being issued? Human rights violations have been cited, but every country has human rights violations of one sort or another. Some have more violations and/or different types than others, but every country has skeletons in the closet. Violence has been suggested too, but apart from violence in places the F1 circus will need, how does one separate the various degrees of violence that are considered permissible and those which are not?

So I would conclude that there is little F1 can do politically to protect itself from this sort of situation, even in terms of relatively uncontroversial things like avoiding politically unstable countries (unless of course the instability is of a type likely to prevent the race being run in the first place).

Is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

This final question reverses the focus. Up to now, it's been a question of if F1 should give the world anything from an ethico-political perspective. Now it's whether the world can give anything to F1.

In Bahrain Bother 1, I mentioned Frank Herbert's quote that "the layered society is an invitation to violence". While nobody is suggesting that anyone will ever get into fisticuffs over F1's psuedopolitics, the verbal equivalent is not only possible but has happened on numerous occasions.

The powers-that-be in F1 have many layers. Drivers, teams, officials, the FIA, CVC/Bernie, circuit organisers... ...so many interest groups, so little equality, so much potential for trouble.

It is difficult to use the standard political response to repair the issue. "Democracy" in F1 could never be especially representative because even surveys of F1 supporters have never netted much more than 100,000 total, despite the true number being well into the millions in many countries. Hardly the basis for a representative governance.

As for internal representativeness, there's a surfeit of those. FOTA, GPDA, OWG, MBNP (OK, I made the last one up...**). They don't seem to get to do a huge amount because of the pre-established power structures. Said structures seem to spend half their time getting in each other's way, let alone the way of these upstarts. It would take a wholesale reorganisation to stop this from happening but nobody seems to have the authority, let alone the appetite, to do it by themselves...

F1 can learn from the Middle East that there's an inherent problem with its structure. That said, the different countries there are each coming up with their own solutions to the problem of an inherently unstable layered society and so will F1.

Conclusions

F1 isn't very political, cannot become very political, but sadly cannot justify sending their people to Bahrain yet. It can certainly learn from the Middle East but applying the lessons will be difficult.

* - Jordan the country, I hasten to add, not Jordan the TV pundit...

** - MBNP hypothetically means Massive Bunch of Noisy People.

Warning! Long entry alert!

I've been thinking what to write for this for most of the week. Normally F1 tackles politics by avoiding it with a 10-foot bargepole; Bernie focuses on the almighty [insert currency here] and the FIA is apolitical by statute.

The events of the past week in the Middle East have prevented the possibility of solution through ignorance.

First of all, some background. The chain of events that led to the current FCO travel advice not to go to Bahrain unless strictly necessary started in December 2010 over in Tunisia. The recession, poor living conditions, corruption and dissatisfaction with a lack of political freedoms resulted in a population ripe for turning into a mob.

The eventual spark that ignited the fire of rebelliousness was caused by a dispute over a vegetable cart licence. Cart owner Mohamed Bouazizi, after apparently being assaulted by a police officer and unsuccessfully attempting to get the local police station to hear his complaint, set himself on fire in protest. The people, for the most part, sided with the cart owner. Initial protests concerning his treatment by the police were met with tear gas, obstructionism and a "quasi-curfew".

The people increased their demands in response, eventually demanding the removal from government of the entire ruling party (RCD) and release of political prisoners. Even a reformation of the government with a reduced number of RCD members did nothing to quell the uprising. Eventually the army sided with the protesters and mass resignations followed.

This Sidi Bouzid Revolt triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East. Most of the world is currently in recession, but many if not most countries in the Middle East are characterised with various types of authoritarian regime. While the majority have democratic layers, there have been as many ways of implementing them as there are countries.

Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with corruption and generate nations of layered societies.As Frank Herbert correctly noted, "The layered society is an invitation to violence". This is because each layer tends to envy, covet and/or despise the other layers, resulting in rampant power abuse. In turn, a desire is created to take what rightfully belongs to others, which remains undisclosed and unsatisfied due to fear of said power abuse and the lack of incentive for the powerful to enable uncontrolled social movement.

The countries of the Middle East have shared a bond with one another since Islam first united their common ideologies. They have also experienced common changes that have made them more vulnerable to a tidal change in popular thinking. The average population has slowly become younger, therefore less likely to think conservatively or in accord with the opinions of their elders. They have been typically better-educated than before; in many of the Middle Eastern countries, agriculture has become less important as more highly-skilled services such as banking and business administration have increased in importance.

Oil, which has slowed the transition from agriculture to service-based industry, is becoming less important as it is increasingly clear the resource is finite. Many of the countries which had oil have diversified successfully, but it has broadened horizons.

Most importantly, many people are engaging with the internet and social media - which are proving more difficult to censor than more traditional communication channels. Newspapers, broadcast channels and even static web sites can easily be influenced by rulers in their home nation should they be so inclined. Trying to influence thousands or even millions of individual connections and accounts across multiple networks, many of which aren't even in the Middle East, has proven vastly more complicated.

The reduced censorship has not only emboldened people but provided easier access in materials on how to voice their complaints. Non-violent manuals easily downloadable (PDF) from the internet have contributed to the ability of protest organisers to make their protests effective. People who have been involved in previous protests can share their expertise.

Furthermore, it is easier for the people to give direct accounts of what they believe to the world and for the world to answer back. Most of the traffic on social networks consists of spam, banter and matters of relatively minor importance (in approximately that order). However, it is also possible for a large number of people to give the same message to those involved in political strife. It reminds those people that the world is watching. It can help people remember that those people have standards and thus utilise peer pressure to modify behaviour. It can demonstrate the failure of censorship and the politics of fear. It can even encourage normally-apathetic people to engage with the issues of the day, thus increasing pressure on the governments not directly involved to state their stance and bring their great powers to bear.

All this provided a highly unstable backdrop; the governments of many Middle Eastern countries simply hadn't adapted to the changes enforced by the passing of time. Protest dominoes suddenly looked likely, just as Gdańsk had become the trigger for the downfall of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and pan-European revolts in the 1840s started with the Chartists in Britain.

Egypt was the next to feel the wrath of a dissatisfied people. Change happened over a period of weeks, as various measures were tried and found wanting by a population wanting wholesale regime change rather than just dismissing the odd minister.

In fact, there had been resistance for years but it took the Tunisian experience to catalyse it into the violent clashes, mass striking and constant demonstrating that eventually ensued. By February 11, even President Mubarak had seen the writing on the wall and resigned. Since then, things appear to have stayed calm (touch wood) pending discussions on how to ensure the reduced repression and application of a stronger democratic structure demanded by the population. Events have demonstrated that the old regimes cannot be replaced like for like and that something new is needed - and not just in Egypt.

15 other countries in the Arab world have featured protests - or more than protests - since Tunisia's revolution began. These had been going on for six weeks before the F1 world noticed, for Bahrain looked to be among the most stable of the Arab nations.

Bahrain has a prosperous economy and has had democratic institutions in its constitution for a decade. The trouble was that many people, particularly among the Shia, had not had their fortunes uplifted in line with those of their nation and the institutions are easily overruled by the King and other members of the royal family. The protestors tried to keep the sectarianism out of the equation but the government still saw a sectarian threat, which increased tensions. There were also complaints about the number of political prisoners in Bahrain. The success of the Egyptian revolt in particular inspired the dissatisfied to action.

The King paid 1000 Bahraini dinars (£615.10) to every citizen in the country on February 14, the 10-year anniversary of the constitution that should have ensured the democratic institutions were powerful. It is rumoured that this was an attempt to head off the demonstrations. If so, it failed. On February 14, there was a mass occupation of the streets across Bahrain. One protester died, but it was his funeral next day that turned the situation from a purely political problem to one that involved the motorsport community.

Police fired at the funeral procession, killing one person, injuring 25 and pushing thousands into believing the powers-that-be had abandoned them. It was into the resulting bloodstained fury that the GP2 Asia circus entered the country. Will Buxton vividly described the situation in the country on the relatively quiet day before first practise was due to begin. The reports from others indicated that increasing amounts of violence were being employed by the police and army, a tactic which never helps calmness of people or encourage stability of government. The official position attempted to reassure foreigners that they were still safe in Bahrain, but increasingly people were having doubts.

Practise itself started with the ART and iSport teams playing football against each other because the medical staff due to support the race's requirements were recalled to Manama to assist the injured. The riot police had started using live bullets in addition to the tear gas and batons used previously. Clearly, it was dangerous for the GP2 Asia people to remain in Manama and there was no prospect of getting the medical staff back in time to run the race anyway. This was sufficient reason for the FIA's Bahrain branch to cancel the race, using Article 1.3 of Appendix O of the International Sporting Code:

"Recommendations regarding the number of personnel should be complied with throughout the event; if it is not possible... ...the programme of the event should be rearranged".

The press release was rather less verbose, but it posed a clear message to F1. If Bahrain could not safely host a GP2 race, what chance a F1 test two weeks later - or indeed the F1 race a week after that? Many people on the internet were arguing against going to Bahrain, and not because of the complaints of previous years concerning low overtaking opportunities and general blandness. The violence in the region is ongoing, despite the Crown Prince's pleas for calm and orders for the army to leave Manama having resulted in an entire day without bloodshed.

Insurance for many people in the F1 paddock is currently invalid with respect to travel to Bahrain, and is likely to remain so unless and until the various international travel advisers are assured the current peace is permanent. Sponsors may be reluctant to associate themselves with the country for the time being. Nick Heidfeld, one of the more thoughtful drivers on the F1 grid, has urged sensitivity - a level-headed approach, but is there time between now and the point where visa applications and freight transportation demand an answer?

How can F1 justify sending its people into a country where there is probable danger over and above the inherent danger of racing at over 200 mph? What ethical responsibilities does the sport have, given that ethical expectations have changed across the world as well as in the Middle East? Politically, what can - or should - F1 do to prevent itself from facing similar problems in future? Oh, and is there anything F1's own psuedopolitical structures can learn from the lessons of the Middle East?

I hope to answer these in my next blog entry. Until then, I leave you with a link to a comment I made on F1 Fanatic that may convince you that F1 - whatever it does - cannot be truly apolitical about this.